سعر نظام تداول الانبعاثات

تنقيح المرحلة 4 (2021-2030)
قدمت المفوضية الأوروبية في يوليو 2018 اقتراحا تشريعيا لمراجعة نظام تداول الانبعاثات في الاتحاد الأوروبي (إتس) للفترة بعد عام 2020.
هذه هي الخطوة الأولى في تحقيق هدف الاتحاد الأوروبي للحد من انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة بنسبة 40٪ على الأقل محليا بحلول عام 2030 بما يتماشى مع إطار سياسة المناخ والطاقة لعام 2030 وكجزء من مساهمته في اتفاق باريس.
زيادة وتيرة خفض الانبعاثات.
ولتحقيق هدف الاتحاد الأوروبي بنسبة 40٪ على الأقل، يتعين على القطاعات التي تغطيها إتس خفض انبعاثاتها بنسبة 43٪ مقارنة بعام 2005.
ولهذه الغاية، سينخفض ​​العدد الإجمالي لبدلات الانبعاثات بمعدل سنوي قدره 2.2٪ اعتبارا من عام 2021 فصاعدا، مقارنة بنسبة 1.74٪ حاليا.
وهذا يمثل خفضا إضافيا للانبعاثات في القطاعات التي تغطيها إتس حوالي 556 مليون طن على مدى العقد - أي ما يعادل الانبعاثات السنوية للمملكة المتحدة.
أفضل استهداف قواعد تسرب الكربون.
ويضع المقترح أيضا قواعد يمكن التنبؤ بها وقوية ونزيهة للتصدي لخطر تسرب الكربون.
إعادة النظر في نظام التوزيع المجاني للتركيز على القطاعات الأكثر عرضة لخطر نقل إنتاجها خارج الاتحاد الأوروبي - نحو 50 قطاعا في المجموع عدد كبير من البدلات المجانية المخصصة للمنشآت الجديدة والمتنامية قواعد أكثر مرونة لتحسين مواءمة كمية البدلات المجانية مع أرقام الإنتاج تحديث للمعايير التي تعكس التقدم التكنولوجي منذ عام 2008.
ومن المتوقع تخصيص حوالي 6.3 بلايين من البدلات مجانا للشركات خلال الفترة 2021-2030.
تمويل الابتكار منخفض الكربون وتحديث قطاع الطاقة.
وسيتم إنشاء العديد من آليات الدعم لمساعدة الصناعة وقطاعات الطاقة على مواجهة تحديات الابتكار والاستثمار في الانتقال إلى اقتصاد منخفض الكربون.
وهي تشمل صندوقين جديدين:
صندوق االبتكار - توسيع نطاق الدعم القائم من أجل إظهار التكنولوجيات المبتكرة لتحقيق االبتكار في صندوق التحديث الصناعي - تسهيل االستثمارات في تحديث قطاع الطاقة وأنظمة الطاقة األوسع وتعزيز كفاءة الطاقة في 10 دول أعضاء منخفضة الدخل.
وستظل البدلات المجانية متاحة أيضا لتحديث قطاع الطاقة في هذه الدول الأعضاء ذات الدخل المنخفض.
مدخلات أصحاب المصلحة.
وشارك أصحاب المصلحة في مراحل مختلفة في تطوير هذا الاقتراح.
وأجريت مشاورات واسعة النطاق في عام 2018، بما في ذلك.
وعقب هذه المشاورات وتحليل أهداف سياسة المناخ للاتحاد الأوروبي لعام 2030، أجرت اللجنة تقييما للأثر.
وقدم الاقتراح التشريعي إلى البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس واللجنة الاقتصادية والاجتماعية ولجنة الأقاليم لمواصلة النظر فيه بموجب الإجراء التشريعي العادي.
وكان للجمهور إمكانية تقديم تعليقات بشأن الاقتراح التشريعي بعد اعتماده من قبل المفوضية الأوروبية. ووردت ردود فعل من 85 من أصحاب المصلحة وقدم موجز إلى البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي.

نظام الاتحاد الأوروبي لتجارة الانبعاثات (الاتحاد الأوروبي إتس)
وأوضح نظام الاتحاد الأوروبي لتجارة الانبعاثات.
ويعد نظام االتحاد األوروبي لتداول االنبعاثات) إيتس (حجر الزاوية في سياسة االتحاد األوروبي لمكافحة تغير المناخ وأداة رئيسية للحد من انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة من حيث التكلفة. هذا هو أول سوق الكربون الرئيسي في العالم ولا يزال أكبر واحد.
تعمل في 31 دولة (جميع دول الاتحاد الأوروبي البالغ عددها 28 دولة بالإضافة إلى أيسلندا وليختنشتاين والنرويج) تحد من الانبعاثات من أكثر من 11،000 منشأة تستخدم الطاقة الثقيلة (محطات توليد الكهرباء والمنشآت الصناعية) وتغطي شركات الطيران العاملة بين هذه البلدان حوالي 45٪ من غازات الدفيئة في الاتحاد الأوروبي الانبعاثات.
للحصول على نظرة عامة مفصلة، ​​انظر:
A 'كاب والتجارة' النظام.
تعمل إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي على مبدأ "الحد والتجارة".
يتم تحديد سقف على إجمالي كمية غازات الدفيئة معينة التي يمكن أن تنبعث من المنشآت التي يغطيها النظام. ويتم تخفيض الحد الأقصى بمرور الوقت بحيث ينخفض ​​إجمالي الانبعاثات.
وفي إطار الحد الأقصى، تتلقى الشركات أو تشتري بدلات الانبعاثات التي يمكن أن تتاجر بها مع بعضها البعض حسب الحاجة. ويمكنهم أيضا شراء كميات محدودة من القروض الدولية من مشاريع إنقاذ الانبعاثات في جميع أنحاء العالم. ويضمن الحد الأقصى لعدد البدلات المتاحة أن يكون لها قيمة.
وبعد كل سنة، يجب على الشركة أن تسلم ما يكفي من البدلات لتغطية جميع انبعاثاتها، وإلا فرضت غرامات كبيرة. وإذا خفضت الشركة انبعاثاتها، فإنها يمكن أن تحتفظ بدلات احتياطية لتغطية احتياجاتها المستقبلية أو أن تبيعها إلى شركة أخرى تقل عن المخصصات.
فالتجارة تجلب المرونة التي تضمن خفض الانبعاثات حيث تكلف أقل من ذلك. كما يعزز سعر الكربون القوي الاستثمار في التكنولوجيات النظيفة والمنخفضة الكربون.
الملامح الرئيسية للمرحلة 3 (2018-2020)
وقد أصبح الاتحاد الأوروبي للاتصالات الأوروبية الآن في مرحلته الثالثة - يختلف كثيرا عن المرحلتين 1 و 2.
التغييرات الرئيسية هي:
يتم تطبيق سقف واحد على مستوى الاتحاد الأوروبي على الانبعاثات بدلا من النظام السابق للقبعات الوطنية يعتبر المزاد هو الطريقة الافتراضية لتخصيص البدلات (بدلا من التخصيص المجاني)، وتنطبق قواعد التوزيع المنسقة على البدلات التي لا تزال تمنح مجانا. تضمنت الغازات 300 مليون بدلات خصصت في احتياطي المشردين الجدد لتمويل نشر تكنولوجيات مبتكرة للطاقة المتجددة واحتجاز الكربون وتخزينه من خلال برنامج 300 نر.
القطاعات والغازات المشمولة.
ويغطي النظام القطاعات والغازات التالية مع التركيز على الانبعاثات التي يمكن قياسها والإبلاغ عنها والتحقق منها بمستوى عال من الدقة:
من ثاني أكسيد الكربون (CO2) من قطاعات توليد الطاقة والطاقة الحرارية كثيفة الاستخدام للطاقة بما في ذلك مصافي النفط والأعمال الحديدية وإنتاج الحديد والألمنيوم والمعادن والاسمنت والجير والزجاج والسيراميك ولب الورق والورق والكرتون والأحماض والمواد الكيميائية العضوية السائبة أكسيد النيتروز التجاري (N 2 O) من إنتاج أحماض النيتريك والأديبيك والجليوكسيليك ومركبات الكربون الهيدروكلورية فلورية غليوكسال (بكس) من إنتاج الألومنيوم.
المشاركة في إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي إلزامية للشركات في هذه القطاعات، ولكن.
في بعض القطاعات فقط النباتات فوق حجم معين يتم تضمين بعض المنشآت الصغيرة يمكن استبعادها إذا وضعت الحكومات تدابير مالية أو غيرها من شأنها أن خفض انبعاثاتها من قبل ما يعادلها في قطاع الطيران، حتى عام 2018 ينطبق إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي فقط على الرحلات الجوية بين المطارات الواقعة في المنطقة الاقتصادية الأوروبية (إيا).
تقديم تخفيضات في الانبعاثات.
وقد أثبتت إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي أن وضع سعر على الكربون والتداول في ذلك يمكن أن تعمل. وتنخفض الانبعاثات من المنشآت في المخطط حسب الغرض - بنحو 5٪ مقارنة مع بداية المرحلة 3 (2018) (انظر أرقام 2018).
وفي عام 2020، ستكون الانبعاثات من القطاعات التي يغطيها النظام أقل بنسبة 21 في المائة عما كانت عليه في عام 2005.
تطوير سوق الكربون.
أنشئت في عام 2005، والاتحاد الأوروبي إتس هو أول وأكبر نظام دولي للانبعاثات الانبعاثات في العالم، وهو ما يمثل أكثر من ثلاثة أرباع التجارة الدولية للكربون.
كما تلهم إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي تطوير تجارة الانبعاثات في بلدان ومناطق أخرى. ويهدف الاتحاد الأوروبي إلى ربط إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي مع أنظمة أخرى متوافقة.
التشريعات الرئيسية للاتحاد الأوروبي بشأن التجارة الإلكترونية.
30/04/2018 - نسخة موحدة من التوجيه 2003/87 / إيك للبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الذي ينشئ مخططا لتداول بدل انبعاث غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة وتعديل توجيه المجلس رقم 96/61 / إيك 23/04/2009 - التوجيه رقم 2009/29 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي المعدل للتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك من أجل تحسين وتوسيع نطاق خطة تداول بدل غازات الدفيئة في الجماعة 19/11/2008 - التوجيه 2008/101 / إيك والبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الذي يعدل التوجيه 2003/87 / إيك بحيث يشمل أنشطة الطيران في مخطط تداول بدل غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة 27/10/2004 - الأمر التوجيهي 2004/101 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي و المجلس الذي يعدل التوجيه 2003/87 / إيك الذي ينشئ خطة لتداول بدل انبعاث غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة فيما يتعلق بآليات مشروع بروتوكول كيوتو 13/10/2003 - الأمر التوجيهي 2003/87 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والاتحاد الأوروبي نيل التي تضع مخططا لتداول بدل انبعاث غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة وتعديل توجيه المجلس 96/61 / إيك.
تقارير سوق الكربون.
23/11/2017 - كوم (2017) 693 - تقرير عن أداء سوق الكربون الأوروبي 01/02/2017 - كوم (2017) 48 - تقرير عن أداء سوق الكربون الأوروبي 18/11/2018 - كوم 2018) 576 - تقرير عن أداء سوق الكربون الأوروبي 14/11/2018 - كوم (2018) 652 - حالة سوق الكربون الأوروبي في عام 2018.
تنقيح إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي للمرحلة 3.
04/02/2018 - استنتاجات المجلس الأوروبي المؤرخة 4 شباط / فبراير 2018 (انظر الاستنتاجين 23 و 24) 18/03/2018 - إرشادات بشأن تفسير المرفق الأول لتوجيه الاتحاد الأوروبي بشأن التجارة الإلكترونية (باستثناء أنشطة الطيران) 18/03/2018 - إرشادات ورقة تعريفية لمولدات الكهرباء 06/04/2009 - بيان صحفي صادر عن المجلس حول اعتماد مجموعة المناخ والطاقة 12/12/2008 - استنتاجات رئاسة المجلس الأوروبي (11 و 12 ديسمبر 2008) 12/12/2008 - المجلس الأوروبي بيان بشأن استخدام عائدات المزادات 23/01/2008 - اقتراح بتوجيه من البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس بتعديل التوجيه 2003/87 / إيك من أجل تحسين وتوسيع نظام تداول بدل غازات الدفيئة في المجتمع 23 / 01/2008 - وثيقة عمل موظفي اللجنة - وثيقة مصاحبة للاقتراح الخاص بتوجيه للبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس المعدل للتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك من أجل تحسين وتوسيع نطاق نظام الاتحاد الأوروبي لبدل انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة - تقييم الأثر.
التنفيذ.
04/07/2018 - مشروع لائحة تنظيمية بشأن تحديد الاستحقاقات الائتمانية الدولية 05/06/2018 - مشروع لائحة بشأن تحديد استحقاقات الائتمان الدولي 05/05/2018 لائحة المفوضية رقم الاتحاد الأوروبي رقم 389/2018 بتاريخ 2 مايو 2018 بشأن إنشاء السجل الاتحادي إلى التوجيه رقم 2003/87 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي، والمرسومين رقم 280/2004 / إيك رقم 406/2009 / إيك للبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي، وإلغاء لائحة المفوضية الأوروبية رقم 920/2018 و لا 1193/2018 نص ذو صلة بالمنطقة الاقتصادية الأوروبية 18/11/2018 - لائحة اللجنة التي تنشئ سجل الاتحاد لفترة التداول التي تبدأ في 1 يناير 2018 وفترات التداول اللاحقة من مخطط الإتجار في الانبعاثات بالاتحاد وفقا للتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك والبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس، والمقرر 280/2004 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي، وتعديل اللائحة التنفيذية رقم 2216/2004 والاتحاد الأوروبي رقم 920/2018 - لم تنشر بعد في الجريدة الرسمية 07 / 10/2018 - كوميسيون ريجول (الاتحاد الأوروبي) رقم 920/2018 لنظام موحد ومضمون للسجلات عملا بالتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي والقرار رقم 280/2004 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس - بما في ذلك التغييرات التي أدخلتها لائحة 18 نوفمبر 2018 08/10/2008 - لائحة المفوضية (إيك) رقم 994/2008 لنظام موحد ومضمون من السجلات وفقا للتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك للبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي - القرار رقم 280/2004 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس - الإصدار الساري حتى 31 ديسمبر 2018 26/10/2007 - قرار اللجنة المشتركة للمنطقة الاقتصادية الأوروبية رقم 146/2007 الذي يربط الاتحاد الأوروبي بالإنكليزية إتس مع النرويج وأيسلندا وليختنشتاين 13/11 / 2006 - قرار اللجنة 2006/780 / إيك بشأن تجنب الازدواجية المزدوجة لانبعاثات غازات الدفيئة في إطار خطة الجماعة المعنية بتداول الانبعاثات لأنشطة المشاريع بموجب بروتوكول كيوتو عملا بالتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس (ن) (2006) 5362) 21/12/2004 - نسخة موحدة من لائحة المفوضية (إيك) رقم 2216/2004 بشأن نظام موحد ومضمون للسجلات معدلة بموجب لائحة المفوضية رقم 916/2007 المؤرخة 31 يوليو / تموز 2007، لائحة المفوضية (إيك) رقم 994/2008 المؤرخة 8 أكتوبر 2008 ولائحة المفوضية (يو) رقم 920/2018 المؤرخة 7 أكتوبر 2018 - نسخة لا تشمل التغييرات التي أدخلتها لائحة 18 نوفمبر 2018.
تطبيق ضريبة القيمة المضافة.
التاريخ التشريعي للتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك.
العمل قبل اقتراح اللجنة.
08/02/2000 - كوم (2000) 87 - ورقة خضراء بشأن الاتجار بانبعاثات غازات الدفيئة في إطار الاتحاد الأوروبي ولاية ونتائج الفريق العامل الأول التابع للجنة إكب: الآليات المرنة 04/09/2001 - المحضر الموجز لاجتماع التشاور مع أصحاب المصلحة (مع الصناعة والمنظمات غير الحكومية البيئية) 19/05/1999 - كوم (1999) 230 - التحضير لتنفيذ بروتوكول كيوتو 03/06/1998 - كوم (1998) 353 - تغير المناخ - نحو استراتيجية ما بعد كيوتو للاتحاد الأوروبي نطاق إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي : 07/2007 - المنشآت الصغيرة داخل الاتحاد الأوروبي نظام تداول الانبعاثات 10/2006 - إدراج أنشطة إضافية والغازات في الاتحاد الأوروبي نظام تداول الانبعاثات مزيد من المواءمة وزيادة القدرة على التنبؤ: 12/2006 - النهج إلى الداخلين الجدد والإغلاق 10/2006 - مزاد بدائل انبعاث ثاني أآسيد الكربون في الاتحاد الأوروبي إتس 10/2006 - مواءمة منهجيات التخصيص 12/2006 - تقرير عن القدرة التنافسية الدولية فريق عمل إكب المعني بتداول الانبعاثات في استعراض إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي 15/06/2007 - التقرير النهائي للمي 4 بشأن الربط مع أنظمة تجارة الانبعاثات في الدول الثالثة 22/05/2007 - التقرير النهائي للاجتماع الثالث حول مزيد من المواءمة وزيادة القدرة على التنبؤ 26/04/2007 - التقرير النهائي للاجتماع الثاني حول الامتثال الصارم وإنفاذ القانون 09/03/2007 - التقرير النهائي للاجتماع الأول بشأن نطاق التوجيه.
أكتوبر 2001.
22/01/2002 - ورقة غير رسمية عن أوجه التآزر بين اقتراح المفوضية الأوروبية بشأن الاتجار بالانبعاثات (كوم (2001) 581) وتوجيه الاتفاقية الدولية لوقاية النباتات 23/10/2001 - كوم (2001) 581 - اقتراح بشأن توجيه إطاري لتداول انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة الأوروبية.
رد فعل اللجنة على قراءة الاقتراح في المجلس والبرلمان (بما في ذلك الموقف المشترك للمجلس)
18/07/2003 - كوم (2003) 463 - رأي اللجنة بشأن تعديلات البرلمان الأوروبي على الموقف المشترك للمجلس بشأن اقتراح توجيه البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي 20/06/2003 - كوم (2003) 364 - الاتصال باللجنة إلى البرلمان الأوروبي بشأن الموقف المشترك للمجلس بشأن اعتماد توجيه يضع مخططا لتداول بدل انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة وتعديل توجيه المجلس 96/61 / إيك 18/03/2003 - الموقف المشترك (إيك ) لا 28/2003 - الموقف المشترك للمجلس بشأن اعتماد توجيه يضع مخططا لتداول بدل انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة وتعديل توجيه المجلس 96/61 / إيك 27/11/2002 - كوم (2002) 680 - اقتراح معدل لتوجيه من البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس يضع مخططا لتداول بدل انبعاث غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة وتعديل توجيه المجلس 96/61 / إيك فاق.
افتح جميع الأسئلة.
أسئلة وأجوبة بشأن نظام الاتحاد الأوروبي المنقح لتداول الانبعاثات (كانون الأول / ديسمبر 2008)
ما هو الهدف من تداول الانبعاثات؟
والهدف من نظام االتحاد األوروبي لتداول االنبعاثات هو مساعدة الدول األعضاء في االتحاد األوروبي على تحقيق التزاماتها للحد من انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة أو الحد منها بطريقة فعالة من حيث التكلفة. والسماح للشركات المشاركة بشراء أو بيع بدلات الانبعاثات يعني أن التخفيضات في الانبعاثات يمكن تحقيقها بأقل تكلفة.
إن إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي هو حجر الزاوية في استراتيجية الاتحاد الأوروبي لمكافحة تغير المناخ. وهو أول نظام تجاري دولي لانبعاثات ثاني أكسيد الكربون في العالم، وهو يعمل منذ عام 2005. واعتبارا من الأول من كانون الثاني / يناير 2008، لا ينطبق هذا النظام على الدول الأعضاء في الاتحاد الأوروبي البالغ عددها 27 دولة فحسب، بل ينطبق أيضا على الأعضاء الثلاثة الآخرين في المنطقة الاقتصادية الأوروبية - النرويج وأيسلندا وليختنشتاين. وهي تغطي حاليا أكثر من 000 10 منشأة في قطاعي الطاقة والصناعة وهما مسؤولان جماعيا عن ما يقرب من نصف انبعاثات الاتحاد الأوروبي من ثاني أكسيد الكربون و 40 في المائة من مجموع انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة. ومن شأن إدخال تعديل على توجيه الاتحاد الأوروبي بشأن التجارة الإلكترونية المتفق عليه في تموز / يوليه 2008 أن يجلب قطاع الطيران إلى النظام اعتبارا من عام 2018.
كيف يعمل تداول الانبعاثات؟
و إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي هو نظام "سقف والتجارة"، وهذا يعني أنه يحد من المستوى العام للانبعاثات المسموح بها ولكن، في حدود هذا، يسمح للمشاركين في النظام لشراء وبيع البدلات كما تتطلب. هذه البدلات هي "عملة" التداول المشتركة في قلب النظام. يمنح أحد البدلات لصاحب الحق الحق في انبعاث طن واحد من ثاني أكسيد الكربون أو ما يعادله من غازات الدفيئة الأخرى. ويؤدي الحد الأقصى لعدد البدلات إلى نشوء ندرة في السوق.
وفي فترة التداول الأولى والثانية في إطار هذا المخطط، كان على الدول الأعضاء أن تضع خططا وطنية للتخصيص تحدد المستوى الكلي لانبعاثاتها، وكم عدد البدلات التي تصدرها كل منشأة في بلدها. وفي نهاية كل سنة يجب أن تسلم المنشآت بدلات تعادل انبعاثاتها. ويمكن للشركات التي تبقي انبعاثاتها دون مستوى بدلاتها أن تبيع بدلاتها الزائدة. ويواجه أولئك الذين يواجهون صعوبة في الحفاظ على انبعاثاتهم وفقا لبدلاتهم خيارا بين اتخاذ تدابير للحد من انبعاثاتهم الخاصة - مثل الاستثمار في تكنولوجيا أكثر كفاءة أو استخدام مصادر طاقة أقل كثافة من الكربون - أو شراء البدلات الإضافية التي يحتاجونها في السوق ، أو مزيج من الاثنين. ومن المرجح أن تحدد هذه الخيارات بتكاليف نسبية. وبهذه الطريقة، تخفض الانبعاثات حيثما يكون ذلك أكثر فعالية من حيث التكلفة.
كم من الوقت كان الاتحاد الأوروبي إتس تعمل؟
تم إطلاق إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي في 1 يناير 2005. استمرت فترة التداول الأولى لمدة ثلاث سنوات حتى نهاية عام 2007 وكانت مرحلة "التعلم بالممارسة" للتحضير لفترة التداول الثانية الحاسمة. وبدأت فترة التداول الثانية في 1 يناير 2008 وتستمر لمدة خمس سنوات حتى نهاية عام 2018. وتأتي أهمية فترة التداول الثانية من كونها تتزامن مع فترة الالتزام الأولى لبروتوكول كيوتو، يجب على البلدان الصناعية أن تحقق أهدافها للحد من انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة أو الحد منها. وبالنسبة لفترة التداول الثانية، تم تحديد انبعاثات الاتحاد الأوروبي لانبعاثات غازات الدفيئة بنحو 6.5٪ عن مستويات عام 2005 للمساعدة على ضمان أن الاتحاد الأوروبي ككل، والدول الأعضاء على حدة، يفي بالتزامات كيوتو.
ما هي الدروس الرئيسية المستفادة من التجربة حتى الآن؟
وقد وضعت إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي سعرا على الكربون وأثبتت أن الاتجار في انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة يعمل. وقد أنشأت فترة التداول الأولى بنجاح التداول الحر لبدلات الانبعاث في جميع أنحاء الاتحاد الأوروبي، ووضعت البنية التحتية اللازمة، ووضعت سوقا ديناميكية للكربون. وقد تكون الفائدة البيئية للمرحلة الأولى محدودة بسبب التوزيع المفرط للبدلات في بعض الدول الأعضاء وبعض القطاعات، ويرجع ذلك أساسا إلى الاعتماد على إسقاطات الانبعاثات قبل أن تصبح بيانات الانبعاثات التي تم التحقق منها متاحة في إطار إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي. وعندما أبرز نشر بيانات الانبعاثات المؤكدة لعام 2005 هذا "الإفراط في تخصيص"، كان رد فعل السوق كما هو متوقع من خلال خفض سعر السوق للبدلات. وقد أتاح توافر بيانات الانبعاثات المؤكدة للجنة أن تكفل تحديد الحد الأقصى للمخصصات الوطنية في إطار المرحلة الثانية على مستوى يؤدي إلى تخفيضات حقيقية في الانبعاثات.
وإلى جانب التأكيد على الحاجة إلى بيانات تم التحقق منها، أثبتت التجربة حتى الآن أن زيادة المواءمة داخل إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي أمر حتمي لضمان أن يحقق الاتحاد الأوروبي أهدافه في خفض الانبعاثات على الأقل بتكلفة وبحد أدنى من التشوهات التنافسية. والحاجة إلى مزيد من المواءمة أوضح فيما يتعلق بكيفية تحديد الحد الأقصى لبدلات الانبعاثات الإجمالية.
وتبين الفترتان التجاريتان الأوليان أيضا أن الطرق الوطنية المختلفة على نطاق واسع لتخصيص البدلات للمنشآت تهدد المنافسة العادلة في السوق الداخلية. وعلاوة على ذلك، هناك حاجة إلى قدر أكبر من المواءمة والتوضيح والتنقيح فيما يتعلق بنطاق النظام، وإمكانية الحصول على ائتمانات من مشاريع خفض الانبعاثات خارج الاتحاد الأوروبي، وشروط ربط النظام الأوروبي لتكنولوجيا الاتصالات بالأنظمة التجارية للانبعاثات في أماكن أخرى، متطلبات تقديم التقارير.
ما هي التغييرات الرئيسية في إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي، ومتى سيتم تطبيقها؟
وستطبق التغييرات المتفق عليها للتصميم اعتبارا من فترة التداول الثالثة، أي يناير / كانون الثاني 2018. وبينما ستبدأ الأعمال التحضيرية فورا، لن تتغير القواعد السارية حتى يناير 2018 لضمان الحفاظ على الاستقرار التنظيمي.
وستكون معاهدة التجارة الأوروبية للاتحاد الأوروبي في الفترة الثالثة نظاما أكثر كفاءة وأكثر اتساقا وعدلا.
وتتحقق زيادة الكفاءة من خالل فرتة تداول أطول) 8 سنوات بدال من 5 سنوات (، وخفض انبعاثات قوي ومتراجع سنويا) انخفاض بنسبة 21٪ يف عام 2020 مقارنة بعام 2005 (وزيادة كبرية يف كمية املزادات) من أقل من 4٪ في المرحلة 2 إلى أكثر من النصف في المرحلة 3).
وتم الاتفاق على مزيد من المواءمة في العديد من المجالات، بما في ذلك فيما يتعلق بتحديد الحد الأقصى (وهو سقف على نطاق الاتحاد الأوروبي بدلا من الحدود الوطنية في المرحلتين 1 و 2) والقواعد المتعلقة بالتخصيص الحر الانتقالي.
وقد ازدادت عدالة النظام زيادة كبيرة من خلال التحرك نحو قواعد التخصيص المجاني على نطاق الاتحاد الأوروبي للمنشآت الصناعية وبإدخال آلية لإعادة التوزيع تخول للدول الأعضاء الجديدة في المزاد المزيد من البدلات.
كيف يقارن النص النهائي مع اقتراح اللجنة الأولي؟
وقد تم الحفاظ على أهداف المناخ والطاقة التي وافق عليها مجلس الربيع الأوروبي لعام 2007، ولا يزال الهيكل العام لاقتراح اللجنة بشأن إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي سليما. بمعنى أنه سيكون هناك سقف واحد على مستوى الاتحاد الأوروبي على عدد بدلات الانبعاثات، وسوف ينخفض ​​هذا الحد سنويا على طول خط اتجاه خطى، والذي سيستمر بعد نهاية فترة التداول الثالثة (2018-2020). والفرق الرئيسي مقارنة بالمقترح هو أن مزاد العلاوات سيتم تدريجيا على نحو أبطأ.
ما هي التغييرات الرئيسية مقارنة باقتراح اللجنة؟
وباختصار، فإن التغييرات الرئيسية التي أدخلت على المقترح هي كما يلي:
ويسمح لبعض الدول الأعضاء بانتقاص اختياري ومؤقت من القاعدة التي تنص على عدم تخصيص أي بدلات مجانا لمولدات الكهرباء اعتبارا من عام 2018. ويتاح هذا الخيار للتقييد للدول الأعضاء التي تستوفي شروطا معينة تتعلق بالترابط بين الكهرباء وحصة وقود أحفوري واحد في إنتاج الكهرباء، ونصيب الفرد من الناتج المحلي الإجمالي بالنسبة لمتوسط ​​الاتحاد الأوروبي 27. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، فإن مقدار البدلات المجانية التي يمكن أن تخصصها دولة عضو لمحطات توليد الطاقة يقتصر على 70 في المائة من انبعاثات ثاني أكسيد الكربون من المصانع ذات الصلة في المرحلة 1 والتراجع في السنوات التالية. وعلاوة على ذلك، لا يمكن تخصيص التخصيص المجاني في المرحلة 3 إلا لمحطات توليد الطاقة التي تعمل أو قيد الإنشاء في موعد لا يتجاوز نهاية عام 2008. انظر الرد على السؤال 15 أدناه. وسيكون هناك مزيد من التفاصيل في التوجيه بشأن المعايير التي ستستخدم لتحديد القطاعات أو القطاعات الفرعية التي تعتبر معرضة لخطر كبير من تسرب الكربون، وتاريخ سابق لنشر قائمة اللجنة لهذه القطاعات (31 كانون الأول / ديسمبر) 2009). وعلاوة على ذلك، تخضع المنشآت في جميع الصناعات المعرضة لبدلات مجانية بنسبة 100 في المائة إلى الحد الذي تستخدم فيه التكنولوجيا الأكثر كفاءة، رهنا بالاستعراض عند التوصل إلى اتفاق دولي مرض. ويقتصر التوزيع الحر للصناعة على حصة انبعاثات هذه الصناعات في إجمالي الانبعاثات في الفترة من عام 2005 إلى عام 2007. وسوف ينخفض ​​مجموع البدلات المخصصة مجانا للمنشآت في قطاعات الصناعة سنويا بما يتماشى مع انخفاض سقف الانبعاثات. كما يجوز للدول الأعضاء أن تعوض منشآت معينة عن تكاليف ثاني أكسيد الكربون التي تم تمريرها في أسعار الكهرباء إذا كانت تكاليف ثاني أكسيد الكربون قد تعرضها لخطر تسرب الكربون. وتعهدت اللجنة بتعديل المبادئ التوجيهية للجماعة بشأن المعونة الحكومية لحماية البيئة في هذا الصدد. انظر الرد على السؤال 15 أدناه. وسيزداد مستوى المزاد العلني للبدلات للصناعات غير المعرضة بطريقة خطية على النحو الذي اقترحته اللجنة، ولكن بدلا من الوصول إلى 100٪ بحلول عام 2020 سيصل إلى 70٪، بهدف الوصول إلى 100٪ بحلول عام 2027. وكما هو متوقع في فإن اقتراح اللجنة، سيعاد توزيع 10 في المائة من البدلات المخصصة للمزاد العلني من الدول الأعضاء ذات الدخل الفردي المرتفع إلى ذوي الدخل الفردي المنخفض من أجل تعزيز القدرة المالية لهذه البلدان على الاستثمار في التكنولوجيات الصديقة للبيئة. وقد أضيفت مخصصات لآلية إعادة توزيع أخرى بنسبة 2 في المائة من البدلات المزاد بالمزاد العلني لتأخذ في الاعتبار الدول الأعضاء التي حققت في عام 2005 انخفاضا بنسبة 20 في المائة على الأقل في انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة مقارنة بالسنة المرجعية التي حددها بروتوكول كيوتو. وتزداد حصة إيرادات المزادات التي توصي الدول الأعضاء باستخدامها لمكافحة تغير المناخ والتكيف معه بشكل رئيسي داخل الاتحاد الأوروبي، ولكن أيضا في البلدان النامية، من 20٪ إلى 50٪. وينص النص على زيادة المستوى المقترح لاستخدام اعتمادات الجماعة الإسلامية / آلية التنمية النظيفة في سيناريو بنسبة 20 في المائة بالنسبة للمشغلين الحاليين الذين حصلوا على أقل الميزانيات لاستيراد واستخدام هذه الائتمانات فيما يتعلق بالمخصصات والوصول إلى الائتمانات في الفترة 2008-2018. وستكون القطاعات الجديدة والداخلين الجدد في الفترتين 2018-2020 و 2008-2018 قادرين أيضا على استخدام الائتمانات. ومع ذلك، فإن المبلغ الإجمالي للائتمانات التي يمكن استخدامها لن يتجاوز 50 في المائة من التخفيض بين عامي 2008 و 2020. واستنادا إلى تخفيض أكثر صرامة للانبعاثات في سياق اتفاق دولي مرض، يمكن للجنة أن تسمح بالوصول الإضافي إلى وحدات خفض الانبعاثات المعتمدة ووحدات خفض الانبعاثات للمشغلين في مخطط الجماعة. انظر الرد على السؤال 20 أدناه. وستستخدم العائدات من مزاد 300 مليون بدالة من احتياطي الوافدين الجدد لدعم ما يصل إلى 12 مشروعا ومشروعا إيضاحيا بشأن احتجاز وتخزين الكربون تبين تكنولوجيات مبتكرة للطاقة المتجددة. وهناك عدد من الشروط المرفقة بآلية التمويل هذه. انظر الرد على السؤال 30 أدناه. وقد تم توسيع إمكانية اختيار منشآت الاحتراق الصغيرة بشرط خضوعها لتدابير مماثلة لتغطي جميع المنشآت الصغيرة بغض النظر عن النشاط، فقد تم رفع عتبة الانبعاثات من 10،000 إلى 25،000 طن من ثاني أكسيد الكربون سنويا، وعتبة القدرة التي منشآت الاحتراق يجب أن تفي بالإضافة قد أثيرت من 25MW إلى 35MW. ومع هذه العتبات المتزايدة، تصبح حصة الانبعاثات المغطاة التي يحتمل استبعادها من نظام الاتجار بالانبعاثات هامة، وبالتالي أضيف حكم يسمح بإجراء تخفيض مناظر في الحد الأقصى للبدلات على نطاق الاتحاد الأوروبي.
هل ستظل هناك خطط وطنية للتخصيص (نابس)؟
لا، حددت الدول الأعضاء في خطط عملها الوطنية للفترة الأولى (2005-2007) والفترة التجارية الثانية (2008-2018) الكمية الإجمالية للبدلات التي ستصدر - الحد الأقصى - وكيفية تخصيصها للمنشآت المعنية. وقد ولد هذا النهج اختلافات كبيرة في قواعد التخصيص، مما يخلق حافزا لكل دولة عضو على تفضيل صناعتها الخاصة، وأدى إلى تعقيد كبير.
واعتبارا من فترة التداول الثالثة، سيكون هناك سقف واحد على نطاق الاتحاد الأوروبي وسيتم تخصيص البدلات على أساس القواعد المنسقة. ولذلك لن تكون هناك حاجة إلى خطط تخصيص وطنية.
كيف سيتم تحديد الحد الأقصى للانبعاثات في المرحلة 3؟
وفيما يلي قواعد حساب سقف الاتحاد الأوروبي:
واعتبارا من عام 2018، سينخفض ​​العدد الإجمالي للبدلات سنويا بطريقة خطية. ونقطة البداية في هذا الخط هي متوسط ​​الكمية الإجمالية للبدلات (سقف المرحلة الثانية) الذي ستصدره الدول الأعضاء للفترة 2008-12، وتعديله ليعكس النطاق الواسع للنظام اعتبارا من عام 2018، وكذلك أي منشآت صغيرة عضو وقد اختارت الدول استبعادها. والعامل الخطي الذي ينخفض ​​به المبلغ السنوي هو 1.74٪ بالنسبة إلى غطاء المرحلة 2.
ونقطة الانطلاق لتحديد العامل الخطي 1.74٪ هي التخفيض العام بنسبة 20٪ لغازات الدفيئة مقارنة بعام 1990، وهو ما يعادل انخفاضا بنسبة 14٪ مقارنة بعام 2005. ومع ذلك، يلزم تخفيض أكبر في إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي لأنه أرخص لخفض الانبعاثات في قطاعات إتس. وتقسم الشعبة التي تقلل من تكلفة التخفيض الإجمالية إلى ما يلي:
انخفاض بنسبة 21٪ في انبعاثات قطاع إتس في الاتحاد الأوروبي مقارنة بعام 2005 بحلول عام 2020؛ وهو ما يمثل انخفاضا بنحو 10٪ مقارنة بعام 2005 بالنسبة للقطاعات التي لا تغطيها إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي.
ويؤدي التخفيض بنسبة 21 في المائة في عام 2020 إلى الحد الأقصى لمعاهدة التعاون التقني في عام 2020 بحد أقصى قدره 1720 مليونا من البدلات، وهو ما يعني أن متوسط ​​الحد الأقصى للمرحلة الثالثة (2018 إلى 2020) يبلغ نحو 1846 مليون بدل وخفض 11 في المائة بالمقارنة مع سقف المرحلة الثانية.
وتتوافق جميع الأرقام المطلقة مع التغطية في بداية فترة التداول الثانية، وبالتالي لا تأخذ في الحسبان الطيران، والتي ستضاف في عام 2018، والقطاعات الأخرى التي ستضاف في المرحلة 3.
وستحدد اللجنة الأرقام النهائية لأرقام الانبعاثات السنوية في المرحلة 3 وتنشرها بحلول 30 أيلول / سبتمبر 2018.
كيف سيتم تحديد الحد الأقصى للانبعاثات بعد المرحلة 3؟
وسيستمر تطبيق العامل الخطي بنسبة 1.74٪ لتحديد سقف المرحلة 3 بعد نهاية فترة التداول في عام 2020، وسيحدد الحد الأقصى لفترة التداول الرابعة (2021 إلى 2028) وما بعدها. ويمكن تعديله بحلول عام 2025 على أبعد تقدير. في الواقع، سيكون من الضروري تخفيضات كبيرة في الانبعاثات بنسبة 60٪ -80٪ ​​مقارنة بعام 1990 بحلول عام 2050 للوصول إلى الهدف الاستراتيجي المتمثل في الحد من الزيادة العالمية في درجات الحرارة إلى ما لا يزيد عن درجتين مئويتين فوق مستويات ما قبل الصناعة.
وسيتم تحديد سقف على نطاق الاتحاد الأوروبي لبدلات الانبعاثات لكل سنة على حدة. هل سيؤدي ذلك إلى تقليل المرونة للمنشآت المعنية؟
لا، لن يتم تخفيض المرونة للمنشآت على الإطلاق. وفي أي سنة، يتعين على السلطات المختصة أن تصدر العلاوات المزمع مزادها وتوزيعها بحلول 28 شباط / فبراير. وآخر موعد لتقديم بدلات الاسترداد هو 30 نيسان / أبريل من السنة التالية للسنة التي حدثت فيها الانبعاثات. لذلك يحصل المشغلون على بدلات للسنة الحالية قبل أن يضطروا إلى تقديم بدلات لتغطية انبعاثاتهم للسنة السابقة. وتبقى العلاوات سارية طوال فرتة التداول، وميكن اآلن "أن تكون" املخصصات الفائضة "مصرفية" الستخدامها يف فرتات املتاجرة الالحقة. وفي هذا الصدد لن يتغير شيء.
وسيبقى النظام قائما على فترات التداول، ولكن فترة التداول الثالثة ستستمر ثماني سنوات، من 2018 إلى 2020، مقابل خمس سنوات للمرحلة الثانية من 2008 إلى 2018.
وبالنسبة لفترة التداول الثانية، قررت الدول الأعضاء عموما تخصيص كميات متساوية من البدلات لكل سنة. وسيتطابق الانخفاض الخطي كل سنة اعتبارا من 2018 مع اتجاهات الانبعاثات المتوقعة على نحو أفضل خلال هذه الفترة.
ما هي الأرقام السنوية المؤقتة لرسوم إتس للفترة 2018-2018؟
فيما يلي أرقام رأس المال السنوية المبدئية:
These figures are based on the scope of the ETS as applicable in phase 2 (2008 to 2018), and the Commission's decisions on the national allocation plans for phase 2, amounting to 2083 million tonnes. These figures will be adjusted for several reasons. Firstly, adjustment will be made to take into account the extensions of the scope in phase 2, provided that Member States substantiate and verify their emissions accruing from these extensions. Secondly, adjustment will be made with respect to further extensions of the scope of the ETS in the third trading period. Thirdly, any opt-out of small installations will lead to a corresponding reduction of the cap. Fourthly, the figures do not take account of the inclusion of aviation, nor of emissions from Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.
Will allowances still be allocated for free?
نعم فعلا. Industrial installations will receive transitional free allocation. And in those Member States that are eligible for the optional derogation, power plants may, if the Member State so decides, also receive free allowances. It is estimated that at least half of the available allowances as of 2018 will be auctioned.
While the great majority of allowances has been allocated free of charge to installations in the first and second trading periods, the Commission proposed that auctioning of allowances should become the basic principle for allocation. This is because auctioning best ensures the efficiency, transparency and simplicity of the system and creates the greatest incentive for investments in a low-carbon economy. It best complies with the “polluter pays principle” and avoids giving windfall profits to certain sectors that have passed on the notional cost of allowances to their customers despite receiving them for free.
How will allowances be handed out for free?
By 31 December 2018, the Commission will adopt EU-wide rules, which will be developed under a committee procedure (“Comitology”). These rules will fully harmonise allocations and thus all firms across the EU with the same or similar activities will be subject to the same rules. The rules will ensure as far as possible that the allocation promotes carbon-efficient technologies. The adopted rules provide that to the extent feasible, allocations are to be based on so-called benchmarks, e. g. a number of allowances per quantity of historical output. Such rules reward operators that have taken early action to reduce greenhouse gases, better reflect the polluter pays principle and give stronger incentives to reduce emissions, as allocations would no longer depend on historical emissions. All allocations are to be determined before the start of the third trading period and no ex-post adjustments will be allowed.
Which installations will receive free allocations and which will not? How will negative impacts on competitiveness be avoided?
Taking into account their ability to pass on the increased cost of emission allowances, full auctioning is the rule from 2018 onwards for electricity generators. However, Member States who fulfil certain conditions relating to their interconnectivity or their share of fossil fuels in electricity production and GDP per capita in relation to the EU-27 average, have the option to temporarily deviate from this rule with respect to existing power plants. The auctioning rate in 2018 is to be at least 30% in relation to emissions in the first period and has to increase progressively to 100% no later than 2020. If the option is applied, the Member State has to undertake to invest in improving and upgrading of the infrastructure, in clean technologies and in diversification of their energy mix and sources of supply for an amount to the extent possible equal to the market value of the free allocation.
In other sectors, allocations for free will be phased out progressively from 2018, with Member States agreeing to start at 20% auctioning in 2018, increasing to 70% auctioning in 2020 with a view to reaching 100% in 2027. However, an exception will be made for installations in sectors that are found to be exposed to a significant risk of 'carbon leakage'. This risk could occur if the EU ETS increased production costs so much that companies decided to relocate production to areas outside the EU that are not subject to comparable emission constraints. The Commission will determine the sectors concerned by 31 December 2009. To do this, the Commission will assess inter alia whether the direct and indirect additional production costs induced by the implementation of the ETS Directive as a proportion of gross value added exceed 5% and whether the total value of its exports and imports divided by the total value of its turnover and imports exceeds 10%. If the result for either of these criteria exceeds 30%, the sector would also be considered to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage. Installations in these sectors would receive 100% of their share in the annually declining total quantity of allowances for free. The share of these industries' emissions is determined in relation to total ETS emissions in 2005 to 2007.
CO 2 costs passed on in electricity prices could also expose certain installations to the risk of carbon leakage. In order to avoid such risk, Member States may grant a compensation with respect to such costs. In the absence of an international agreement on climate change, the Commission has undertaken to modify the Community guidelines on state aid for environmental protection in this respect.
Under an international agreement which ensures that competitors in other parts of the world bear a comparable cost, the risk of carbon leakage may well be negligible. Therefore, by 30 June 2018, the Commission will carry out an in-depth assessment of the situation of energy-intensive industry and the risk of carbon leakage, in the light of the outcome of the international negotiations and also taking into account any binding sectoral agreements that may have been concluded. The report will be accompanied by any proposals considered appropriate. These could potentially include maintaining or adjusting the proportion of allowances received free of charge to industrial installations that are particularly exposed to global competition or including importers of the products concerned in the ETS.
Who will organise the auctions and how will they be carried out?
Member States will be responsible for ensuring that the allowances given to them are auctioned. Each Member State has to decide whether it wants to develop its own auctioning infrastructure and platform or whether it wants to cooperate with other Member States to develop regional or EU-wide solutions. The distribution of the auctioning rights to Member States is largely based on emissions in phase 1 of the EU ETS, but a part of the rights will be redistributed from richer Member States to poorer ones to take account of the lower GDP per head and higher prospects for growth and emissions among the latter. It is still the case that 10% of the rights to auction allowances will be redistributed from Member States with high per capita income to those with low per capita income in order to strengthen the financial capacity of the latter to invest in climate friendly technologies. However, a provision has been added for another redistributive mechanism of 2% to take into account Member States which in 2005 had achieved a reduction of at least 20% in greenhouse gas emissions compared with the reference year set by the Kyoto Protocol. Nine Member States benefit from this provision.
Any auctioning must respect the rules of the internal market and must therefore be open to any potential buyer under non-discriminatory conditions. By 30 June 2018, the Commission will adopt a Regulation (through the comitology procedure) that will provide the appropriate rules and conditions for ensuring efficient, coordinated auctions without disturbing the allowance market.
How many allowances will each Member State auction and how is this amount determined?
All allowances which are not allocated free of charge will be auctioned. A total of 88% of allowances to be auctioned by each Member State is distributed on the basis of the Member State's share of historic emissions under the EU ETS. For purposes of solidarity and growth, 12% of the total quantity is distributed in a way that takes into account GDP per capita and the achievements under the Kyoto-Protocol.
Which sectors and gases are covered as of 2018?
The ETS covers installations performing specified activities. Since the start it has covered, above certain capacity thresholds, power stations and other combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel plants and factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper and board. As for greenhouse gases, it currently only covers carbon dioxide emissions, with the exception of the Netherlands, which has opted in emissions from nitrous oxide.
As from 2018, the scope of the ETS will be extended to also include other sectors and greenhouse gases. CO 2 emissions from petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminium will be included, as will N2O emissions from the production of nitric, adipic and glyocalic acid production and perfluorocarbons from the aluminium sector. The capture, transport and geological storage of all greenhouse gas emissions will also be covered. These sectors will receive allowances free of charge according to EU-wide rules, in the same way as other industrial sectors already covered.
As of 2018, aviation will also be included in the EU ETS.
Will small installations be excluded from the scope?
A large number of installations emitting relatively low amounts of CO 2 are currently covered by the ETS and concerns have been raised over the cost-effectiveness of their inclusion. As from 2018, Member States will be allowed to remove these installations from the ETS under certain conditions. The installations concerned are those whose reported emissions were lower than 25 000 tonnes of CO 2 equivalent in each of the 3 years preceding the year of application. For combustion installations, an additional capacity threshold of 35MW applies. In addition Member States are given the possibility to exclude installations operated by hospitals. The installations may be excluded from the ETS only if they will be covered by measures that will achieve an equivalent contribution to emission reductions.
How many emission credits from third countries will be allowed?
For the second trading period, Member States allowed their operators to use significant quantities of credits generated by emission-saving projects undertaken in third countries to cover part of their emissions in the same way as they use ETS allowances. The revised Directive extends the rights to use these credits for the third trading period and allows a limited additional quantity to be used in such a way that the overall use of credits is limited to 50% of the EU-wide reductions over the period 2008-2020. For existing installations, and excluding new sectors within the scope, this will represent a total level of access of approximately 1.6 billion credits over the period 2008-2020. In practice, this means that existing operators will be able to use credits up to a minimum of 11% of their allocation during the period 2008-2018, while a top-up is foreseen for operators with the lowest sum of free allocation and allowed use of credits in the 2008-2018 period. New sectors and new entrants in the third trading period will have a guaranteed minimum access of 4.5% of their verified emissions during the period 2018-2020. For the aviation sector, the minimum access will be 1.5%. The precise percentages will be determined through comitology.
These projects must be officially recognised under the Kyoto Protocol’s Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism (covering projects carried out in countries with an emissions reduction target under the Protocol) or Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (for projects undertaken in developing countries). Credits from JI projects are known as Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) while those from CDM projects are called Certified Emission Reductions (CERs).
On the quality side only credits from project types eligible for use in the EU trading scheme during the period 2008-2018 will be accepted in the period 2018-2020. Furthermore, from 1 January 2018 measures may be applied to restrict the use of specific credits from project types. Such a quality control mechanism is needed to assure the environmental and economic integrity of future project types.
To create greater flexibility, and in the absence of an international agreement being concluded by 31 December 2009, credits could be used in accordance with agreements concluded with third countries. The use of these credits should however not increase the overall number beyond 50% of the required reductions. Such agreements would not be required for new projects that started from 2018 onwards in Least Developed Countries.
Based on a stricter emissions reduction in the context of a satisfactory international agreement , additional access to credits could be allowed, as well as the use of additional types of project credits or other mechanisms created under the international agreement. However, once an international agreement has been reached, from January 2018 onwards only credits from projects in third countries that have ratified the agreement or from additional types of project approved by the Commission will be eligible for use in the Community scheme.
Will it be possible to use credits from carbon ‘sinks’ like forests?
No. Before making its proposal, the Commission analysed the possibility of allowing credits from certain types of land use, land-use change and forestry (‘LULUCF’) projects which absorb carbon from the atmosphere. It concluded that doing so could undermine the environmental integrity of the EU ETS, for the following reasons:
LULUCF projects cannot physically deliver permanent emissions reductions. Insufficient solutions have been developed to deal with the uncertainties, non-permanence of carbon storage and potential emissions 'leakage' problems arising from such projects. The temporary and reversible nature of such activities would pose considerable risks in a company-based trading system and impose great liability risks on Member States. The inclusion of LULUCF projects in the ETS would require a quality of monitoring and reporting comparable to the monitoring and reporting of emissions from installations currently covered by the system. This is not available at present and is likely to incur costs which would substantially reduce the attractiveness of including such projects. The simplicity, transparency and predictability of the ETS would be considerably reduced. Moreover, the sheer quantity of potential credits entering the system could undermine the functioning of the carbon market unless their role were limited, in which case their potential benefits would become marginal.
The Commission, the Council and the European Parliament believe that global deforestation can be better addressed through other instruments. For example, using part of the proceeds from auctioning allowances in the EU ETS could generate additional means to invest in LULUCF activities both inside and outside the EU, and may provide a model for future expansion. In this respect the Commission has proposed to set up the Global Forest Carbon Mechanism that would be a performance-based system for financing reductions in deforestation levels in developing countries.
Besides those already mentioned, are there other credits that could be used in the revised ETS?
نعم فعلا. Projects in EU Member States which reduce greenhouse gas emissions not covered by the ETS could issue credits. These Community projects would need to be managed according to common EU provisions set up by the Commission in order to be tradable throughout the system. Such provisions would be adopted only for projects that cannot be realised through inclusion in the ETS. The provisions will seek to ensure that credits from Community projects do not result in double-counting of emission reductions nor impede other policy measures to reduce emissions not covered by the ETS, and that they are based on simple, easily administered rules.
Are there measures in place to ensure that the price of allowances won't fall sharply during the third trading period?
A stable and predictable regulatory framework is vital for market stability. The revised Directive makes the regulatory framework as predictable as possible in order to boost stability and rule out policy-induced volatility. Important elements in this respect are the determination of the cap on emissions in the Directive well in advance of the start of the trading period, a linear reduction factor for the cap on emissions which continues to apply also beyond 2020 and the extension of the trading period from 5 to 8 years. The sharp fall in the allowance price during the first trading period was due to over-allocation of allowances which could not be “banked” for use in the second trading period. For the second and subsequent trading periods, Member States are obliged to allow the banking of allowances from one period to the next and therefore the end of one trading period is not expected to have any impact on the price.
A new provision will apply as of 2018 in case of excessive price fluctuations in the allowance market. If, for more than six consecutive months, the allowance price is more than three times the average price of allowances during the two preceding years on the European market, the Commission will convene a meeting with Member States. If it is found that the price evolution does not correspond to market fundamentals, the Commission may either allow Member States to bring forward the auctioning of a part of the quantity to be auctioned, or allow them to auction up to 25% of the remaining allowances in the new entrant reserve.
The price of allowances is determined by supply and demand and reflects fundamental factors like economic growth, fuel prices, rainfall and wind (availability of renewable energy) and temperature (demand for heating and cooling) etc. A degree of uncertainty is inevitable for such factors. The markets, however, allow participants to hedge the risks that may result from changes in allowances prices.
Are there any provisions for linking the EU ETS to other emissions trading systems?
نعم فعلا. One of the key means to reduce emissions more cost-effectively is to enhance and further develop the global carbon market. The Commission sees the EU ETS as an important building block for the development of a global network of emission trading systems. Linking other national or regional cap-and-trade emissions trading systems to the EU ETS can create a bigger market, potentially lowering the aggregate cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The increased liquidity and reduced price volatility that this would entail would improve the functioning of markets for emission allowances. This may lead to a global network of trading systems in which participants, including legal entities, can buy emission allowances to fulfil their respective reduction commitments.
The EU is keen to work with the new US Administration to build a transatlantic and indeed global carbon market to act as the motor of a concerted international push to combat climate change.
While the original Directive allows for linking the EU ETS with other industrialised countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, the new rules allow for linking with any country or administrative entity (such as a state or group of states under a federal system) which has established a compatible mandatory cap-and-trade system whose design elements would not undermine the environmental integrity of the EU ETS. Where such systems cap absolute emissions, there would be mutual recognition of allowances issued by them and the EU ETS.
What is a Community registry and how does it work?
Registries are standardised electronic databases ensuring the accurate accounting of the issuance, holding, transfer and cancellation of emission allowances. As a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol in its own right, the Community is also obliged to maintain a registry. This is the Community Registry, which is distinct from the registries of Member States. Allowances issued from 1 January 2018 onwards will be held in the Community registry instead of in national registries.
Will there be any changes to monitoring, reporting and verification requirements?
The Commission will adopt a new Regulation (through the comitology procedure) by 31 December 2018 governing the monitoring and reporting of emissions from the activities listed in Annex I of the Directive. A separate Regulation on the verification of emission reports and the accreditation of verifiers should specify conditions for accreditation, mutual recognition and cancellation of accreditation for verifiers, and for supervision and peer review as appropriate.
What provision will be made for new entrants into the market?
Five percent of the total quantity of allowances will be put into a reserve for new installations or airlines that enter the system after 2018 (“new entrants”). The allocations from this reserve should mirror the allocations to corresponding existing installations.
A part of the new entrant reserve, amounting to 300 million allowances, will be made available to support the investments in up to 12 demonstration projects using the carbon capture and storage technology and demonstration projects using innovative renewable energy technologies. There should be a fair geographical distribution of the projects.
In principle, any allowances remaining in the reserve shall be distributed to Member States for auctioning. The distribution key shall take into account the level to which installations in Member States have benefited from this reserve.
What has been agreed with respect to the financing of the 12 carbon capture and storage demonstration projects requested by a previous European Council?
The European Parliament's Environment Committee tabled an amendment to the EU ETS Directive requiring allowances in the new entrant reserve to be set aside in order to co-finance up to 12 demonstration projects as requested by the European Council in spring 2007. This amendment has later been extended to include also innovative renewable energy technologies that are not commercially viable yet. Projects shall be selected on the basis of objective and transparent criteria that include requirements for knowledge sharing. Support shall be given from the proceeds of these allowances via Member States and shall be complementary to substantial co-financing by the operator of the installation. No project shall receive support via this mechanism that exceeds 15% of the total number of allowances (i. e. 45 million allowances) available for this purpose. The Member State may choose to co-finance the project as well, but will in any case transfer the market value of the attributed allowances to the operator, who will not receive any allowances.
A total of 300 million allowances will therefore be set aside until 2018 for this purpose.
What is the role of an international agreement and its potential impact on EU ETS?
When an international agreement is reached, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council assessing the nature of the measures agreed upon in the international agreement and their implications, in particular with respect to the risk of carbon leakage. On the basis of this report, the Commission shall then adopt a legislative proposal amending the present Directive as appropriate.
For the effects on the use of credits from Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism projects, please see the reply to question 20.
ما هي الخطوات التالية؟
Member States have to bring into force the legal instruments necessary to comply with certain provisions of the revised Directive by 31 December 2009. This concerns the collection of duly substantiated and verified emissions data from installations that will only be covered by the EU ETS as from 2018, and the national lists of installations and the allocation to each one. For the remaining provisions, the national laws, regulations and administrative provisions only have to be ready by 31 December 2018.
The Commission has already started the work on implementation. For example, the collection and analysis of data for use in relation to carbon leakage is ongoing (list of sectors due end 2009). Work is also ongoing to prepare the Regulation on timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning (due by June 2018), the harmonised allocation rules (due end 2018) and the two Regulations on monitoring and reporting of emissions and verification of emissions and accreditation of verifiers (due end 2018).

Phases 1 and 2 (2005-2018)
The rules in the first two trading periods of the EU emissions trading system (EU ETS) differed in important respects from those of the current third period (2018-2020).
First steps.
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol set for the first time legally-binding emissions reduction targets, or caps, for 37 industrialised countries. This led to the need for policy instruments to meet these targets.
In March 2000, the European Commission presented a green paper with some first ideas on the design of the EU ETS. It served as a basis for numerous stakeholder discussions that further helped shape the system.
The EU ETS Directive was adopted in 2003 and the system was launched in 2005.
The cap on allowances was set at national level through national allocation plans (NAPs).
Phase 1 (2005-2007)
This was a 3-year pilot of ‘learning by doing’ to prepare for phase 2, when the EU ETS would need to function effectively to help the EU meet its Kyoto targets.
Key features of phase 1:
Covered only CO2 emissions from power generators and energy-intensive industries Almost all allowances were given to businesses for free The penalty for non-compliance was €40 per tonne.
Phase 1 succeeded in establishing.
a price for carbon free trade in emission allowances across the EU the infrastructure needed to monitor, report and verify emissions from the businesses covered.
In the absence of reliable emissions data, phase 1 caps were set on the basis of estimates. As a result, the total amount of allowances issued exceeded emissions and, with supply significantly exceeding demand, in 2007 the price of allowances fell to zero (phase 1 allowances could not be banked for use in phase 2).
Phase 2 (2008-2018)
Phase 2 coincided with the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, where the countries in the EU ETS had concrete emissions reduction targets to meet.
Key features of phase 2:
Lower cap on allowances (some 6.5% lower compared to 2005) 3 new countries joined – Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway Nitrous oxide emissions from the production of nitric acid included by a number of countries The proportion of free allocation fell slightly to around 90% Several countries held auctions The penalty for non-compliance was increased to €100 per tonne Businesses were allowed to buy international credits totalling around 1.4 billion tonnes of CO2-equivalent Union registry replaced national registries and the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL) replaced the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) The aviation sector was brought into the EU ETS on 1 January 2018 (but application for flights to and from non-European countries was suspended for 2018)
Because verified annual emissions data from the pilot phase was now available, the cap on allowances was reduced in phase 2, based on actual emissions. However, the 2008 economic crisis led to emissions reductions that were greater than expected. This led to a large surplus of allowances and credits , which weighed heavily on the carbon price throughout phase 2.
Evolution of the European carbon market.
The market in emission allowances developed strongly from the start.
In phase 1, trading volumes rose from 321 million allowances in 2005 to 1.1 billion in 2006 and 2.1 billion in 2007 , according to the World Bank’s annual Carbon Market Reports.
The EU ETS remained the main driver of the international carbon market during phase 2. In 2018, for example, EU allowances accounted for 84% of the value of the total global carbon market. Trading volumes jumped from 3.1 billion in 2008 to 6.3 billion in 2009. In 2018, 7.9 billion allowances were traded (worth €56 billion).
Daily trading volumes exceeded 70 million in mid-2018, data compiled by Bloomberg New Energy Finance and London Energy Brokers Association show.
Trading volumes in EU emission allowances (in millions)
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance. Figures taken from Bloomberg, ICE, Bluenext, EEX, GreenX, Climex, CCX, Greenmarket, Nordpool. Other sources include UNFCCC and Bloomberg New Energy Finance estimations.
Monitoring, reporting and verification of EU ETS emissions.
التشريع.
18/08/2018 - Commission Decision on amending Decision 2007/589/EC as regards the inclusion of monitoring and reporting guidelines for greenhouse gas emissions from new activities and gases 08/06/2018 - Commission Decision 2018/345 amending Decision 2007/589/EC as regards the inclusion of monitoring and reporting guidelines for greenhouse gas emissions from the capture, transport and geological storage of carbon dioxide 16/04/2009 - Commission Decision 2009/339/EC of 16 April 2009 amending Decision 2007/589/EC as regards the inclusion of monitoring and reporting guidelines for emissions and tonne-kilometre data from aviation activities 17/12/2008 - Commission Decision 2009/73/EC of 17 December 2008 amending Decision 2007/589/EC as regards the inclusion of monitoring and reporting guidelines for emissions of nitrous oxide 18/07/2007 - Commission Decision 2007/589/EC establishing guidelines for the monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (MRG 2007) 29/01/2004 - Commission Decision 2004/156/EC establishing guidelines for the monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (original monitoring and reporting guidelines)
Electronic templates for reporting of emissions from aircraft operators.
Data exchange formats for EU ETS Phase II.
1a - Tree view representations of EUETSRequest: in. pdf and. png 1b - Tree view representation of EUETSReport: in. pdf and. png 2a - Entity-Relationship Diagrams (ERD's) EUETSRequest: in. pdf and. vsd 2b - Entity-Relationship Diagrams (ERD's) EUETSReport: in. pdf and. vsd 3- Data elements structure and semantical descriptions.

Auctioning.
Auctioning is the default method of allocating allowances within the EU emissions trading system (EU ETS). وهذا يعني أن الشركات لديها لشراء نسبة متزايدة من البدلات من خلال المزادات.
In 2018, over 40% of the allowances were auctioned. Over the period 2018-2020, the share auctioned will be higher: it is estimated that up to half of the allowances may be auctioned.
Member States have generated nearly € 15.8 billion from the auctioning of EU ETS allowances over the period 2018-2018. Based on the most recent information available, more than 80% of these revenues has been used or is planned to be used for climate and energy purposes in line with Article 10(3) of the ETS Directive.
Auctioning is the most transparent allocation method and puts into practice the principle that the polluter should pay.
Two auction platforms are in place:
The European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig is the common platform for the large majority of countries participating in the EU ETS. EEX also acts as Germany's auction platform. The second auction platform is ICE Futures Europe (ICE) in London, which acts as the United Kingdom's platform.
An open, transparent, harmonised and non-discriminatory process.
The auctioning of allowances is governed by the EU ETS Auctioning Regulation. This covers the timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning to ensure it is conducted in an open, transparent, harmonised and non-discriminatory manner.
The Auctioning Regulation seeks to put into practice a number of criteria which the revised EU ETS Directive states auctions must meet, such as predictability, cost-efficiency, fair access to auctions and simultaneous access to relevant information for all operators.
Auctioning share to increase each year over 2018 to 2020.
In sectors other than power generation, a transition to auctioning takes place progressively. Manufacturing industry received 80% of its allowances free of charge in 2018, but this will decrease annually to 30% in 2020, other than for sectors deemed to be exposed to carbon leakage. Allowances not allocated for free are to be auctioned. Given the significant weight of power generation in the EU ETS, and even with partial free allocation in eight Member States, more than 40% of the 2018 annual allowances were auctioned. This share will increase in the following years, as the volume of allowances allocated for free decreases faster than the cap.
In total, the Commission estimates that 57% of the total amount of allowances will be auctioned during 2018-2020, while the remaining allowances are available for free allocation. The Commission's proposal for revision of the EU ETS Directive foresees that the share of allowances to be auctioned will remain the same after 2020. In the second trading period (2008-2018), no more than 4% of the allowances were auctioned. In the aviation sector , 15% of allowances in circulation will be auctioned.
In the context of the 2030 climate and energy framework, EU leaders decided in October 2018 that free allocation shall not expire, but the share of allowances to be auctioned will not reduce during the next decade. Latest information on the exact amounts to be auctioned can be found on the websites of the auction platformsand the FAQ page.
Member States' shares in the auctioning volume.
Pursuant to Article 10(1) of the ETS Directive,
88% of the allowances to be auctioned in 2018 to 2020 are distributed to the EU Member States on the basis of their share of verified emissions from EU ETS installations in 2005 or the average of the 2005-2007 period, whichever one is the highest; 10% are allocated to the least wealthy EU member states as an additional source of revenue to help them invest in reducing the carbon intensity of their economies and adapting to climate change; The remaining 2% is given as a 'Kyoto bonus' to nine EU Member States which by 2005 had reduced their greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20% of levels in their base year or period. These are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.
EU leaders have decided that during the next decade.
90% of the allowances to be auctioned will be distributed to the EU Member States on the basis of their share of verified emissions , and 10% will be allocated to the less wealthy EU Member States for the purposes of solidarity, growth and interconnections.
The three EEA-EFTA countries will also auction allowances in accordance with the same principles as the EU Member States.
At least half of auctioning revenues to be used for climate and energy related purposes.
The revised EU ETS Directive provides that at least 50 % of auctioning revenues or the equivalent in financial value of these revenues should be used by Member States for climate and energy related purposes.
Under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation, Member States are requested to report annually (for the first time by 31 July 2018) on the amounts and use of the revenues generated (article 17 of Regulation (EU) No 525/2018 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2018).
In 2018, the total revenues for the EU reached €3.6 billion. From this, around €3 billion will be used for climate and energy related purposes such as energy efficiency, renewables, research and sustainable transport – significantly more than the 50% level recommended in the EU ETS Directive.
More information on the use of auctioning revenues can be found in the 2018 report on Progress towards achieving the Kyoto and EU 2020 objectives.
Common auction platform.
The Auctioning Regulation provides for the Member States and the Commission to procure jointly a common platform to auction emission allowances on behalf of the Member States.
This is the most cost-efficient approach for Member States and bidders alike. The Commission considers that a common platform also best ensures respect of the principles of non-discrimination, transparency and simplicity, provides the best guarantees for full, fair and equitable access to small and medium sized enterprises and small emitters covered by the EU ETS, and best minimises the risk of market abuse.
Following a competitive tender procedure carried out under a joint procurement agreement, the Commission and 25 Member States re-appointed the European Energy Exchange (EEX) and its clearing system, the European Commodity Clearing (ECC) as common auction platform for these Member States. The three EEA-EFTA states will also contract EEX for the auctioning of their allowances.
The contract with EEX entered into force on 13 July 2018. Information on the corresponding procedure could be found on DG CLIMA page on public procurement.
Opt-out auction platforms for Germany, Poland, UK.
Member States are entitled to opt out of the common platform and appoint their 'own' auction platform. Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom decided to do so.
Germany appointed EEX as its auction platform. The UK appointed ICE Futures Europe (ICE) in London as its auction platform. These appointments have been approved through amendments to the Auctioning Regulation following verification by the Commission that the platforms satisfy the rules of the Regulation and the objectives of the ETS Directive.
In the absence of an opt-out auction platform having been listed, Poland contracted EEX in its capacity as common auction platform to auction on its behalf pending such listing.
Auction monitor.
The Commission and all Member States also have a joint procurement agreement for appointing an auction monitor to monitor and report on the auctions conducted on all platforms as set out in Article 25 of the Auctioning Regulation.
Two procurement procedures were launched in 2018 and 2018 respectively, but the contract could not be awarded. More information can be found on the contracts and grants webpage. The Commission and the Member States are currently assessing their options.
Joint procurement procedures.
The joint procurement agreements between the Commission and the Member States lay down the rules under which they conduct the joint procurement procedures. The procedures are conducted in line with the rules in the Financial Regulation, the standard legal framework for procurement procedures carried out by the Commission.
For third parties, the Commission is the sole point of contact for information concerning the joint procurement procedures. All relevant information will be given in due time and in full respect of the principle of non-discriminatory access to information. See the Commission's information note on this matter.
Contract Notices are always published on Tender Electronic Daily (TED), the electronic version of the supplement S to the Official Journal of the European Union. Tender documents will be made available in due time. Tender documents on past and ongoing tenders are accessible via the contracts and grants pages.
Information relevant for candidate auction platforms and potential participants in the auctions.
Member States may have to make changes to their national laws to implement certain articles of the Auctioning Regulation to make it possible for potential candidates to participate in the procurement procedure for the appointment of auction platforms and to perform the resulting contract.
Similarly, Member States may have to make changes to their national laws to allow certain categories of companies to apply for admission to bid in the auctions or to allow certain categories of companies to bid on behalf of clients.
Information on the implementation of such provisions by Member States is available under the documentation tab.
Auction reports.
Auctions by the common auction platform.
Older reports.
Auctions for Germany.
Older reports.
Auctions for United Kingdom.
Older reports.
Please note that the Commission bears no responsibility for the contents of the reports prepared by Germany and the United Kingdom.
Auctioning Regulation and Joint Procurement Agreements.
Auctioning Regulation and impact assessment.
19/10/2017 - Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/1902 amending Commission Regulation (EU) No 1031/2018 to align the auctioning of allowances with Decision (EU) 2018/1814 of the European Parliament and of the Council and to list an auction platform to be appointed by the United Kingdom 25/02/2018 - Consolidated Auctioning Regulation 25/02/2018 - Commission Regulation EU No 176/2018 amending Regulation (EU) No 1031/2018 in particular to determine the volumes of greenhouse gas emission allowances to be auctioned in 2018-2020 13/11/2018 - Commission Regulation (EU) No 1143/2018 - Amending Regulation (EU) No 1031/2018 on the timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning of greenhouse gas emission allowances pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowances trading within the Community in particular to list an auction platform to be appointed by Germany Text with EEA relevance 07/11/2018 - Commission Regulation (EU) No 1042/2018 amending Regulation (EU) No 1031/2018 to list an auction platform to be appointed by the United Kingdom 31/08/2018 - Commission Regulation (EU) 784/2018 - Amending Regulation (EU) No 1031/2018 to list an auction platform to be appointed by Germany and correcting Article 59(7) thereof 12/11/2018 - Commission Regulation (EU) No 1031/2018 - Timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning of greenhouse gas emission allowances pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowances trading within the Community ("Auctioning Regulation"), as amended by Commission Regulation (EU) No 1210/2018 of 23/11/2018 08/02/2018 - SEC(2018) – Auctioning Regulation: Impact Assessment - executive summary.
Joint Procurement Agreements.
09/11/2018 - Joint Procurement Agreement to procure common auction platforms 09/11/2018 - Joint Procurement Agreement to procure an auction monitor.
Transparency, implementation of the Auctioning Regulation by Member States.
03/11/2018 - Information note from the European Commission on contacts with economic operators or their representatives for matters pertaining to the Joint Procurement Procedure(s) to procure common auction platforms and an auction monitor 05/10/2018 - List of Auctioneers appointed by Member States pursuant Article 22(1) of Commission Regulation No 1031/2018 20/06/2018 - Information on the implementation of Article 18(2) and (3) of the Auctioning Regulation by the Member States and EEA-EFTA States 20/06/2018 - Information on the implementation of Articles 35, 36, 43, 55 and 64 of the Auctioning Regulation by the Member States 26/07/2018 - Transparency Notice of the Commission on the implementation of certain Articles of the Auctioning Regulation and transparency measures with regard to the documents relating to the call for tenders.
Use of auction revenues.
03/2017 - Analysis of the use of Auction Revenues by the Member States 28/10/2018 - 2018 Kyoto and EU 2020 Progress Report (annex) 12/12/2008 - Presidency conclusions of the European Council (11 and 12 December 2008) 12/12/2008 - European Council Statement on the use of auction revenues 23/11/2006 - 2006/803/EC - Commission Decision of 23 November 2006 amending Decision 2005/381/EC establishing a questionnaire for reporting on the application of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC FAQ.
Open all questions.
Questions and Answers: Auctioning.
How many allowances will be auctioned in individual years up to 2020?
The ETS Directive contains the general principle that all allowances not allocated free of charge are to be auctioned. The annual volumes of general allowances to be auctioned and the timing and frequency of auctions are regulated in Chapter III and the volumes of aviation allowances in Chapter II of the Auctioning Regulation.
In Recital 26 of its Decision 2018/448/EU of 5 September 2018 on the national implementation measures with respect to free allocation, the Commission estimated, in accordance with Article 10(1) of Directive 2003/87/EC (ETS Directive), the amount of general allowances to be auctioned in the period from 2018 to 2020 at 8,176,193,157. This amount can be broken down as follows and is used in the determination of the annual auction calendars:
volumes to be allocated free of charge pursuant to Article 10c of the ETS Directive. taking into account allowances withheld for the purposes of back-loading, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 176/2018 of 25 February 2018, and to be placed directly in the Market Stability Reserve pursuant to Article 1(2) of Decision (EU) 2018/1814 (MSR Decision) of 6 October 2018. volume for early auctions, taken into account in subsequent years. figures for 2019 onwards do not yet incorporate further adjustments to the amounts to be auctioned pursuant to Articles 1(5), 1(6) and 1(7) of Decision (EU) 2018/1814 (MSR Decision) of 6 October 2018. On the basis of the estimated amount of surplus allowances mentioned in recital 5 of the MSR Decision it is expected that the application of these articles will result in an adjustment consisting of further deductions from the volume of allowances to be auctioned. cumulative withheld volume in accordance with the published auction calendars pending the start of auctions for the EEA-EFTA States. The volumes for such States will be added in relevant auction calendars as from completion of the necessary arrangements for their auctioning and the table will be adapted accordingly. pursuant to Article 1(2) of Decision (EU) 2018/1814 ( MSR Decision) of 6 October 2018. the difference with the total of the previous column is equal to the volume of the Article 10c non allocated volumes that are added to the auctions as from 2018 (7,809,757 allowances in 2018, 8,451,400 allowances in 2018, 5,138,654 allowances in 2017 and 5,641,832 in 2018) and the correction for allowances to be allocated for free (and accordingly deducted from the auction volume) to small emitters reintroduced into the ETS pursuant to Article 27 of the ETS Directive (74,507 allowances for 2017 and 49,561 allowances for 2018). the amount published in the auction calendars as indicated in the table above includes the volumes (14,986,000 for 2018 and 70,891,000 for 2017) to be auctioned by Poland in 2017 making use of the common auction platform pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 30(7) as well as the auction volume from an auction cancelled in December 2018.
Figures for 2018 to 2018 represent the volumes auctioned or to be auctioned in accordance with the published auction calendars, including indicative volumes. In addition, the 2018 volumes include the volume of 101,053,000 allowances expected to be auctioned by UK as from the publication of their 2018 auction calendar. The 2018 volume had been determined on the basis of a conservative working estimate in the absence of the final information on the free allocation. Furthermore, certain States did not complete the administrative steps to allow auctioning in time, hence their volumes have been withheld. The cumulative withheld volume of 34,064,126 allowances pending the start of auctions for the EEA-EFTA States, is included separately in the table. At the moment of publication of 2018 auction calendars, the 937 557 000 allowances to be auctioned or expected to be auctioned in 2018 plus the cumulative withheld volume of 41,982,348 allowances amounted in total to 979 539 348 allowances. This is without prejudice to the timing and modalities for the auctioning of the withheld volumes which will be announced in due course. Figures for 2019 onwards represent the estimated volumes to be auctioned and are without prejudice for any adjustment that may be needed, including from the application of the Market Stability Reserve from 2019 onwards. As of entry into force of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1210/2018 (Backloading Regulation) of 23 November 2018 amending the Auctioning Regulation for postponing the auctioning of part of the allowances under the 'back-loading', 400 million allowances were withheld in 2018, 300 million in 2018 and 200 million in 2018. In 2018, the total amount of 400 million allowances withheld has been distributed per Member State/EEA EFTA State and the 2018 volumes have been reduced by the corresponding volumes. For Cyprus and Poland, given their allocation of free allowances pursuant to Article 10c of the ETS Directive, the 2018 volumes to be auctioned were less than the volumes to be withheld for the purposes of back-loading, so a corresponding adjustment is done in subsequent years, as provided for by the Regulation Amendment. The adjustment is 738,500 allowances for Cyprus and 6,196,500 allowances for Poland. For Poland this adjustment was fully done in 2018. For Cyprus, taking into consideration the aforementioned adjustment and the 2018 and 2018 volumes withheld for the purposes of back-loading, no allowances are auctioned in 2018 nor 2018, and 246,644 allowances withheld in 2017. Pursuant to Article 1(2) of Decision (EU) 2018/1814 (MSR Decision) of 6 October, the 900 million allowances withheld for the purposes of back-loading will be placed directly into the Market Stability Reserve. The Commission's estimated amount determined in Recital 26 of the Decision 2018/448/EU of 5 September 2018 (NIMs Decision) takes into account all allowances handed out for free, including those for planned modernisation investments in the electricity sector in 8 Member States, and is based on the carbon leakage list valid at that moment. Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Decision (EU) 2018/1814 (MSR Decision) of 6 October 2018, any volumes arising from the reason listed in ninth subparagraph of Article 10(2) of the Auctioning Regulation (so-called "unallocated allowances") will be placed directly into the Market Stability Reserve. In accordance with the Auctioning Regulation and as further specified in the resulting contracts, any difference between the volumes determined in the auction calendars and the figures determined according to Article 10(1) of the ETS Directive, due to the estimation or the withholding of allowances for certain States, is added to the volume to be auctioned in the subsequent year. The volumes that were foreseen for free allocation pursuant to Article 10c of the ETS Directive that were not allocated in previous years by the Member State concerned (for example if investments set out in the national plan and justifying the allocation have not been carried out) are to be auctioned. Accordingly, the volumes as notified by the Member State concerned are added to the auction calendar of the following year, as of 2018. The allowances to be allocated for free to small emitters reintroduced into the ETS pursuant to Article 27 of the ETS Directive are deducted from the respective Member State's auction volume, as notified by the Member State and included in the respective National Allocation Table, as of 2017. The amount to be auctioned or withheld each year per Member State/EEA-EFTA State is rounded down to a multiple of 500 allowances per state; the remaining amount is carried over to the next year. Accordingly, the volumes for 2019 onwards are indicative and the final volumes depend on adjustments related to free allocation, re-introductions of small emitters pursuant to Article 27 of the ETS Directive, retained or carryover volumes. A precise calculation is made each year, which is published by the auctioning platforms through the auction calendars, which are the only valid documents with definitive volumes to be auctioned per year.
15% of the EU aviation allowances for the third trading period are to be auctioned pursuant to Article 3d of the ETS Directive. The Auctioning Regulation further specifies in Article 12(1) and (2) that the volumes to be auctioned each year shall be 15 % of the expected volume of aviation allowances in circulation for that year. In case the auctioned volume for a given year is more or less than 15% of the volume actually put into circulation for that year, the volume to be auctioned in subsequent years is corrected for the difference.
The volume of aviation allowances to be auctioned is further determined in accordance with the derogations provided in the Decision No 377/2018/EU and the Regulation (EU) No 421/2018, and on the basis of the final number of aviation allowances put in circulation for 2018 and on an estimate of the number of aviation allowances to be handed out for free for 2018 to 2018.
In 2018 2.5 million aviation allowances were auctioned, prior to the Decision No 377/2018/EU (stop-the-clock-decision) and the auctions were resumed in 2018 with a volume of 9.2 million, followed by 16.4 million in 2018. In 2018 5,997,500 aviation allowances were auctioned, based on an estimate of expected aviation allowances in circulation for 2018 established on the basis of the National Aviation Allocation Tables at the times of determining the calendar and a positive correction of 343,350 aviation allowances for 2018 and 2018 pursuant to Articles 12(1) and (2) of the ETS Directive.
For 2017, 4,730,500 aviation allowances will be auctioned as from September. This volume is calculated in accordance with the ETS Directive and in line with the Commission proposal reviewing the scope of the EU ETS for aviation Legal reference: Article 28a(3) and Commission proposal COM(2017)54, which takes into account the outcome of the 2018 ICAO Assembly.
The calculation of the auction volume is based on the aviation allowances issued for free for 2017, and it takes into account the allowances issued from the special reserve to new and fast growing aircraft operators, as well as corrections for previous years (as of 1 May 2017). Legal reference: Articles 12(1) and (2) of the Auctioning Regulation for the corrections between expected and actual issuances over 2018 to 2018.
The volume of aviation allowances for the EEA-EFTA States is withheld pending the start of auctions for these States, corresponding to a cumulative amount of 1.3 million aviation allowances for the period 2018-2017.
The auction calendars with exact dates and volumes of general allowances and aviation allowances to be auctioned in the current year are published by the auction platforms :
How many allowances will each Member State have for auctioning?
All allowances which are not allocated free of charge are auctioned. Pursuant to Article 10(2) of the ETS Directive, 88% of the allowances for auctioning are distributed to Member States on the basis of EU ETS emissions in 2005 or the average of the 2005-2007 period, whichever is the highest. 10% of the allowances are distributed to poorer Member States to take account of the lower GDP per head and higher prospects for growth and emissions. Another 2% of the allowances are distributed to nine Member States which in 2005 had achieved a reduction of at least 20% in greenhouse gas emissions compared with the reference year set by the Kyoto Protocol.
For some States, the administrative steps to allow auctioning of the allowances were not completed on time, and the expected volumes were withheld and included in the volumes to be auctioned in subsequent years. This concerned some Member States as indicated in the table below and currently concerns the EEA-EFTA States.
The table below gives an overview of the dates as from which the Member States and EEA EFTA States started auctioning phase 3 allowances:
The auction calendars with exact dates and volumes of general allowances and aviation allowances to be auctioned per Member State in the current year are published by the auction platforms:
When and how often allowances are auctioned ?
Information on the timing, frequency and volume per auction are published by the auction platforms through the auction calendars in due time before the start of the auctions.
Where can data on the auctions be found?
The auction calendars with exact dates and volumes of general allowances and aviation allowances to be auctioned per Member State in the current year are published by the auction platforms. Further, they publish information on the auction results after each auction:
The auction reports published pursuant to Article 10(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC include further details on the auctions for the 25 participating member states, Poland, the United Kingdom and Germany.
How many auction platforms are auctioning allowances?
The Auctioning Regulation provides for a common auction platform but gives Member States the possibility to opt-out and appoint their own auction platform. Germany, Poland and the UK have made use of this option.
At present, two platforms are auctioning allowances under the Auctioning Regulation:
European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig is the common auction platform used by 25 Member States, following a procurement procedure jointly with the Commission; EEX also serves as Germany’s opt-out auction platform; ICE Futures Europe (ICE) in London is the United Kingdom’s opt-out auction platform.
Poland also intends to appoint an opt-out auction platform but is using the common auction platform in the meantime.
The EEA-EFTA States will auction on the common auction platform as well.
An overwhelming majority of stakeholders, a large majority of Member States and the Commission's impact assessment supported a single EU-wide auction platform as it would best meet all objectives laid down in the revised EU ETS: it is most cost efficient, most transparent, best ensures respect of the principle of non-discrimination, and offers the greatest level of harmonisation and predictability as compared to auctioning through two or more parallel national auction platforms.
Opt-out auction platforms must conform to the framework set out in the Auctioning Regulation, which provides for further rules to ensure adequate coordination between the opt-out auction platforms and the common auction platform.
The maximum appointment duration for any auction platform is five years. EEX was appointed as the transitional common auction platform for three years. The contract was, renewed for one additional year, until August 2018. In July 2018, following a joint procurement procedure with the Commission and the participating Member States, EEX was re-appointed as a common auction platform for a period up to five years.
EEX has also been contracted as Germany’s platform. Its first appointment was until December 2018; its second appointment runs for three years, renewable for a further two years; in May 2018 the contract was extended to November 2018. ICE was contracted in November 2018 as the UK’s platform for three years, renewable for two years more; in March 2018 the contract was extended to November 2017.
Since the coexistence of the common auction platform and the opt-out auction platforms inevitably implies less than full harmonisation of the auction process, the arrangements put in place under the Auctioning Regulation will be reviewed in the light of the report on the auctions performed in 2018. The review of the Auctioning Regulation will be carried out in consultation with Member States and stakeholders.
Questions and Answers: Auctioning and its regulation.
What will change after 2020?
In the context of the 2030 climate and energy framework European leaders decided in October 2018 that free allocation will continue after 2020 to prevent the risk of carbon leakage due to climate policy, as long as no comparable efforts are undertaken in other major economies, with the objective of providing appropriate levels of support for sectors at risk of losing international competitiveness. However, the share of allowances to be auctioned will not decrease.
Member States with a GDP per capita below 60% of the EU average may opt to continue to give free allowances to the energy sector up to 2030. However, the maximum amount handed out for free should be limited and the current modalities, including transparency, improved to ensure that the funds are used to promote real investments modernising the energy sector, while avoiding distortions of the internal energy market.
In terms of Member States' shares in the auctioning volume, 90% of allowances to be auctioned will be distributed among all Member States on the basis of verified emissions. The rest will be distributed among those countries whose GDP per capita did not exceed 90% of the EU average (in 2018) for the purposes of solidarity, growth and interconnections.
Why are allowances being auctioned?
With the start of the third trading period in 2018, auctioning is progressively replacing free allocation as the main method for allocating allowances to all EU ETS sectors except aviation. This best ensures the efficiency, transparency and simplicity of the system and creates the greatest incentive for investment in a low-carbon economy. Auctioning will also eliminate windfall profits, which arise when operators charge their customers the cost of allowances they have received for free.
Why is an Auctioning Regulation necessary?
The revised EU ETS Directive adopted in 2009 required the European Commission to adopt a Regulation on the timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning to ensure that auctioning is conducted in an open, transparent, harmonised and non-discriminatory manner. This must support the overarching aims of the revision of the EU ETS, namely greater efficiency of the system, more harmonisation, avoidance of distortion of competition and greater predictability. All these objectives would be at risk without appropriate rules.
The importance of these rules is underpinned by their legal form: a Regulation is the strongest form of EU legislation and its rules are directly applicable in all Member States.
The Auctioning Regulation was adopted by the Commission on 12 November 2018.
How do the auctions work in practice?
The auction format is a single-round, sealed bid, uniform price auction. This is a simple auction format that facilitates participation, including by SMEs and small emitters covered by the ETS Directive.
During a single bidding window of the auction, bidders can place any number of bids, each specifying the number of allowances they would like to buy at a given price. The bidding window is open for at least two hours. Directly following the closure of the bidding window, the auction platform determines and publishes the clearing price at which demand for allowances equals the number of allowances offered for sale in the auction concerned.
Successful bidders are the ones who have placed bids for allowances at or above the clearing price. All successful bidders pay the same price, regardless of the price they specified in their bids.
Articles 7(8), 9 and 32(5) of the Auctioning Regulation define provisions on cancellation of auctions and spreading of the corresponding volumes over subsequent auctions so as to ensure a predictable and smooth repartition of any volumes from cancelled auctions without significant increases of individual auction volumes.
In this respect, should a cancellation occur for an auction which is not consecutive to previous cancellation(s) but already includes adjustments from such cancellation(s), the spreading of the volume cancelled in line with the aforementioned provisions would take place as from the first auction which is not subject to other adjustments due to previous cancellation(s).
What products are auctioned?
The Auctioning Regulation provides for allowances to be auctioned in the form of spot products, which means delivery within a maximum of five working days after the auction. The auctioned product may or may not be a financial instrument in the meaning of the EU regulatory framework for markets in financial instruments. The products auctioned by EEX and ICE are not such financial instruments; exact product specifications are available on the auctioning webpages of EEX and ICE.
Spot products have been chosen for their simplicity and because, unlike futures, they do not lock in the trading of the auctioned allowances to the auction platform(s), which could have a potentially negative impact on competition between trading places in the secondary market.
Who can bid in the auctions?
Auctions are held by auction platforms appointed by national governments but each auction is open to buyers established anywhere in the EU and the EEA-EFTA. The following are eligible to apply for admission to bid in the auctions:
ETS operators and aviation operators, and their parent, subsidiary or affiliate undertakings. Business groupings of operators or aircraft operators acting as an agent on behalf of their members. The concept of "business grouping" requires the existence of a multi-lateral legal relationship between several ETS operators and/or aircraft operators such as a partnership, joint venture or association of such operators and/or aircraft operators. The business grouping must have its own (incorporated or unincorporated) legal identity and statute which clearly indicates that the business grouping is controlled by ETS operators and/or aircraft operators. For bidding in the auctions directly on its own account and acting as an agent on behalf of its members, the business grouping could employ the services of in-house or outside traders who must be natural persons acting as the bidder's representative. Public bodies or state-owned entities that control ETS operators or aviation operators. Investment firms and credit institutions authorised and regulated under EU law. Once admitted, they can bid on their own account. They may also bid on behalf of clients provided that they are authorised to do so by the national competent authority. Such authorisation must be valid with respect to the auctioned products which, as currently auctioned by EEX and ICE, do not constitute a financial instrument under EU legislation for financial markets. Information on the implementation by Member States of the provisions in the Auctioning Regulation concerning the requisite authorisation can be found in this notice. Persons exempt from the authorisation requirements in EU financial law because their trading and investment services activities are only ancillary to their main business (Article 2(1)(i) of Directive 2004/39/EC), but who are authorised under national legislation implementing the rules laid down in the Auctioning Regulation. As is the case for investment firms and credit institutions, they may also bid on behalf of clients provided they are authorised by the national competent authority to do so. Information on the implementation by Member States of these provisions can be found in this notice.
Where investment firms, credit institutions or exempt persons bid on behalf of their clients, they shall ensure that those clients are themselves eligible to apply for admission to bid, i. e. are included in one of the categories above.
See Article 18 of the Auctioning Regulation for the precise wording on the above.
Unauthorised brokers are not eligible to apply for admission to bid, but could play a role in facilitating the formation of business groupings. An interesting and relatively easy business opportunity for a broker might be to form a European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) made up solely of operators and/or aircraft operators. This is a relatively cost-effective means of establishing a business grouping under EU law allowing for cross-border membership. Such an EEIG could then apply to be admitted to bid directly in the auctions and could appoint traders employed by the broker to act as their bidder's representative within the meaning of Article 6(3) of the Auctioning Regulation.
Neither the auctioneer nor the auction platform or its staff may apply for admission to bid.
The auction platform must consider each application for admission in order to prevent auctions being used as a vehicle for money laundering, terrorist financing, criminal activity or market abuse. The auction platform must carry out customer due diligence checks. Complete information on the admission process and criteria can be found on the websites of EEX and ICE.
The Auctioning Regulation thus strikes a balance between the objectives of openness, effective competition and mitigating the risk of money laundering, terrorist financing, criminal activity or market abuse.
How do bidders access the auctions?
Once admitted, bidders are able to access the auctions through the internet. The auction platforms also offer dedicated connections. EEX, furthermore, offers a possibility to submit bids by fax. Complete information on the means of access can be found on the websites of EEX and ICE.
How can SMEs and small emitters access the auctions?
SMEs covered by the EU ETS as well as small emitters can access the auctions directly after going through the due diligence checks. They may also access the auctions through an intermediary or form a business grouping to act as an agent on their behalf. This may offer them the advantage of minimal transaction costs as well as certainty on the price and quantity of allowances they wish to receive.
The design of the auctions has been made as simple as possible to facilitate participation by SMEs. For example, all successful bidders pay the same clearing price so that SMEs and small emitters will not be disadvantaged by having less knowledge than larger participants.
Both EEX and ICE have measures in place to facilitate access for SMEs covered by the EU ETS, as well as for small emitters.
Who is the auctioneer? What is its role?
Each Member State appointed an auctioneer to be able to auction its share of allowances. The auctioneer is responsible for offering the allowances to be auctioned to the auction platform on behalf of the appointing Member State. It also receives the auction proceeds and disburses these proceeds to the appointing Member State.
The auctioneer may be a private or public body. A list of auctioneers can be found under the Documentation tab at the top of this page.
What type of organisation is the auction platform?
The auction platform must be a regulated market authorised under EU financial markets legislation.
Regulated markets have been chosen because they are bound by EU law (the 'Markets in Financial Instruments' Directive and the 'Market Abuse' Directive) to provide a number of safeguards in the conduct of their operations. These safeguards include, among others, arrangements to identify and manage the potential adverse consequences of any conflicts of interest, to identify and manage risks that the market is exposed to, and to have transparent and non-discretionary rules and procedures for fair and orderly trading.
How does the Regulation ensure fair and orderly auctioning?
Fair and orderly auctioning is ensured, firstly, by provisions in the Auctioning Regulation on access to the auctions and on the determination and publication of the auction calendars. The auction platform is obliged to ensure that appropriate ‘know-your-customer’ checks are carried out before it grants admission to any potential bidder.
Secondly, the auction platform must be a regulated market, which ensures that it meets strict standards and will be supervised by the competent national authority for financial markets of the Member State in which it is located.
The Auctioning Regulation includes detailed provisions to mitigate the risk of anti-competitive behaviour. Depending on the product auctioned, the auctions will be covered either by the Market Abuse Directive or by detailed provisions that provide equivalent protection.
Finally, in order to ensure fair treatment of clients, the Auctioning Regulation lays down an authorisation requirement and rules of conduct for intermediaries in case they are not covered by the rules of conduct provided for in the EU Financial legislation. It is, however, optional for Member States to put in place a legal framework for the authorisation of such intermediaries.
More information on carbon market oversight is available on the page 'Ensuring the integrity of the European carbon market'.
Will there be an independent monitor of the auctions? How will it be chosen? What will its role be?
The Auctioning Regulation provides for a single independent auction monitor for all auctions on all auction platforms, to be chosen through a competitive procurement procedure conducted jointly by the Commission and all Member States.
The Auctioning Regulation foresees an integral role for the auction monitor in the oversight of the auctions. Each month, it is to submit a report to Member States and the Commission on all auctions conducted that month. It is to produce a consolidated annual report on the functioning of the auctions, including any evidence of anti-competitive behaviour, market abuse, money laundering, terrorist financing or criminal activity, and the impact of auctioning on the secondary market for allowances. Non-confidential versions of these reports will be published on the Commission's website.
The single auction monitor may also be asked to prepare ad hoc reports on a specific issue relating to auctioning. Furthermore, in light of a suspected breach of the regulation by an auction platform, the single auction monitor must draw up a report stating the nature of the breach, making recommendations to remedy the situation and, if appropriate, recommend the suspension of the auction platform.
Two procurement procedures were launched in 2018 and 2018 respectively, but the contract could not be awarded. The Commission and the Member States are currently assessing their options.
Who will supervise the auctions? How will this be done?
Auctions and auction platforms are supervised at various levels:
supervision of the organisation and conduct of auction platforms; supervision of the organisation and conduct of professional intermediaries bidding on behalf of clients; supervisions of transactions to prevent market abuse; supervision of transactions to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing.
These different layers of supervision are interlinked and complementary.
Authorisation and supervision of an auction platform rests with the competent national authorities of the Member State in which an auction platform is located. The rules that apply to an auction platform's organisation and conduct are those of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (2004/39/EC) and of the Auctioning Regulation.
Professional intermediaries like investment firms, credit institutions or other persons authorised to bid in EU ETS auctions on behalf of others are also licensed and supervised by the relevant national (typically financial) authorities of the Member State where they are located. When bidding on behalf of clients in the auctions, such intermediaries have to abide by the rules set out in the Auctioning Regulation and/or in Directive 2004/39/EC.
Rules against market abuse, set out in the Auctioning Regulation and in the Market Abuse Directive (2003/6/EC), apply to behaviour and transactions of any bidder in the EU ETS auctions. On-going supervision in this area is primarily left to competent authorities of the Member State where an auction platform is located, but competent authorities of other Member States are also empowered to act and their involvement may be indispensable in cross-border investigations and enforcement.
The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in the Member State where the auction platform is located is the competent national authority for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. It is responsible for supervising the auction platform and must ensure compliance of the auction platform with its obligations under the Auctioning Regulation in relation to customer due diligence, the monitoring and record keeping of the relationship with the bidders, surveillance of the auctions, and related notification requirements. The FIU in the Member State where the auction platform is located cooperates with other FIUs through the FIUs Platform and with the national law enforcement authorities in order to effectively prevent and sanction money laundering and terrorist financing, in accordance with Directive 2005/60/EC.
In addition, once appointed, the auction monitor will monitor and report to Member States and the Commission on the functioning of all auctions on all platforms, on the compliance of the auction processes with the objectives of the ETS Directive and the provisions of the Auctioning Regulation and on any evidence of anti-competitive behaviour or market abuse.
The supervision by the competent authorities and the auction monitor is without prejudice to the obligation on the auction platform to survey the auctions itself.
Who will pay for the auction process and the single auction monitor?
The costs of the auction process, including the costs of setting up the technical infrastructure, the actual conduct of the auctions and carrying out due diligence checks on bidders, will in general be paid for by the bidders through the fixed and variable fees they pay to an auction platform to participate in the auctions.
The costs of the single auction monitor will be deducted from the auction proceeds and will be borne by the Member States.
Is it foreseen to review the Auctioning Regulation in the light of experience?
Yes, the Auctioning Regulation will be reviewed following the annual auctioning report for the year 2018.
The review will be carried out in consultation with Member States and stakeholders. The Commission will put forward any measures deemed necessary to deal with any distortion or malfunctioning of the internal market or the carbon market arising from the arrangements under the Regulation with a view to their entry into force by 31 December 2018.
This does not preclude the findings of a wider, ongoing work stream pursuant to Article 12(1a) of the ETS Directive, which is examining whether the EU ETS allowances market is sufficiently protected from market abuse. This work is also concerned with organising the oversight of the European carbon market and securing the market integrity of auctioning and trading.
Were the opinions of stakeholders considered in the drawing up of the Auctioning Regulation? Has the Commission prepared an impact assessment?
Yes, all information on consultations held and on the Commission's impact assessment can be found on the consultation page.
Do other countries running cap and trade systems also auction allowances?
Yes, several other countries and regions auction allowances under emission trading schemes other than EU ETS, or are considering doing so. Further information can be found in the ICAP report. The annual volumes to be auctioned under the EU ETS are by far the largest, however.
Questions and Answers: Joint procurement of the single auction monitor and the common auction platform.
Where can information on the procurement procedures for the common auction platform or the auction monitor be found?
Contract Notices are always published on Tender Electronic Daily (TED), the electronic version of the supplement S to the Official Journal of the European Union. Full tender documents are made available on DG CLIMA's contracts and grants page.
The Commission has published a notice on the Member States' implementation of the Auctioning Regulation and on transparency measures with regard to the documents relating to the call for tenders. As set out in this notice, the Commission may publish draft tender documents in order to ensure maximum transparency and equal treatment during the procedure. The publication of such drafts does not constitute publication or advertising within the meaning of Article 103(1) of the Financial Regulation nor Articles 123, 124 and 125 of the Rules of Application. Any part of such drafts may be changed; the drafts are not binding on the Commission or the Member States taking part in the joint procurement. Only the notices and associated documents relating to the call for tenders published in the OJ shall be authentic.
The Commission is the sole contact point for candidates and tenderers. An nformation note sets out the rules for contacts with economic operators on matters pertaining to the joint procurement procedures.
The Contract Notice for the first common auction platform was published in OJ 2018/S 59-095297 of 24 March 2018, and the full tender documents are available on DG CLIMA's contracts and grants page.
The Prior Information Notice for the second common auction platform was published in OJ 2018/S 118-208551 of 21 June 2018. The Contract Notice for the second common auction platform was published in OJ 2018/S 211-372946 of 1 November 2018, and tender documents are available on DG CLIMA's contracts and grants page.
Two procurement procedures for a procurement of the auction monitor were launched in 2018 and 2018 respectively, but the contract could not be awarded. More information can be found on the contracts and grants webpage.
What is determined in the joint procurement agreements?
Two joint procurement agreements between the participating Member States and the Commission are in force, one for the procurement of the common auction platform and the other for the auction monitor. The agreements lay down the modalities for the conduct of these procurement procedures jointly by the Member States and the Commission.
Among other things, they provide that:
The Commission arranges the overall orientation, preparation and organisation of the joint procurement procedures; The Commission is the sole representative towards third parties and provides administrative support in the course of the joint procurements and the resulting contracts; The Member States, represented in a Joint Procurement Steering Committee (JPSC), provide steering input. Main decisions, notably the adoption of tender documents and award decisions, require prior approval by the (participating) Member States through qualified majority vote in the JPSC. Opt-out Member States may be given observer status in the procurement of the common auction platform(s) if they sign the Joint Procurement Agreement for the sole purpose of being able to make use of the auction platform(s) appointed pursuant to Article 26(1) and (2) of the Auctioning Regulation, in the absence of any listing of their own auction platform(s) in Annex III of the same Regulation. The Joint Procurement Agreement foresees a Contract Management Committee consisting of representatives from the Commission and the Member States to manage the contracts with the common auction platform(s) and the single auction monitor.
The procurement procedures themselves are conducted pursuant to the procurement rules in the Financial Regulation, which is the legal basis for procurement procedures carried out by the Commission.
Opt-out auction platforms.
What is the procedure for approving opt-out auction platforms?
After determining the details of its intended auction platform through a procurement procedure, a Member State opting out of the common auction platform(s) notifies its plans, including all relevant details, to the Commission. The Commission verifies that the auction platform satisfies the rules of the Auctioning Regulation and the objectives of the ETS Directive, and to determine whether obligations or conditions could be required for ensuring adequate coordination between the different auction platforms.
If the Commission is satisfied that the opt-out platform respects the rules and can be expected to achieve the objectives of the ETS Directive, it puts forward a draft amendment of the Auctioning Regulation to list the opt-out platform in an Annex to the Regulation. The adoption of this amendment follows the same procedure as the adoption of the Auctioning Regulation itself, including an opinion by the Member States represented in the Climate Change Committee, followed by a three-month scrutiny period for the Council and the European Parliament. The opt-out platform can start conducting auctions only when the amendment to list it has entered into force.
Under this procedure, EEX has been listed twice as Germany’s opt-out auction platform and ICE as the UK’s. Poland has yet to procure and notify its platform and is in the meantime auctioning on the common auction platform.
What happens to the allowances in question, in the absence of the listing of an opt-out auction platform?
In the absence of an opt-out auction platform being listed, the Member State concerned has to auction its share of allowances on the common auction platform, so as to ensure that the envisaged volume of allowances comes to the market as foreseen in the Auctioning Regulation. Pursuant to this rule, Poland had entered into a contract with EEX as transitional common auction platform and EEX started auctioning for Poland as of 16 September 2018. The continuation of the auctions for Poland is subject to the conclusion of bilateral arrangements between EEX and Poland.
Can a Member State give preferential treatment to its own industry? How is respect of the principle of non-discrimination ensured?
No, Member States cannot give preferential treatment to their own industry. All auction platforms must give all eligible bidders equal access to auctions and no preference can be given to companies registered in any particular Member State. The provision that any auction platform must be a regulated market helps to ensure that all participants are treated in a fair and non-discriminatory way.

Emission trading system price

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Q&A: Will the reformed EU Emissions Trading System raise carbon prices?
Simon Evans.
Simon Evans.
In July 2003, at a series of meetings in Brussels and Strasbourg, EU lawmakers adopted an Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) to help combat climate change.
The cap-and-trade scheme for industrial CO2 was part of the EU’s response to the Kyoto Protocol, which had set the then-15 member bloc a target to cut emissions 8% below 1990 levels by 2018.
Even before its adoption, the EU ETS was subject to years of fraught debate, lobbying and negotiation. After it started operating in 2005, it quickly ran into trouble, facing volatile carbon prices that crashed in the wake of the financial crisis, while industry pocketed windfall profits.
Prices have remained stubbornly low ever since, undermining the supposed role of the ETS as the cornerstone of EU climate policy.
However, last month, after two years of talks, “strengthening reforms” were finally agreed between the EU’s 28 member state governments, the European Commission and MEPs in the European Parliament.
In this Q&A, Carbon Brief runs through the details of the reforms and whether they will raise EU carbon prices. The Brexit question is also covered.
Why did the EU adopt a carbon market?
For the climate policy purists, “putting a price on carbon” represents the most economically efficient means to reduce emissions, at the lowest cost. In a cap-and-trade scheme, industries covered by the market buy and sell allowances to emit greenhouse gases, within a cap that shrinks over time.
This idea is reflected in the text of the 2003 directive, establishing the EU ETS so as to “promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner”. In more extreme versions of this view, no other policies should be needed, as the shrinking cap is all that is needed to meet carbon targets (more on this, below).
The directive had been adopted after failed attempts to introduce a carbon energy tax, first proposed in 1992. It also marked a change of heart. The EU had opposed use of carbon markets under the Kyoto Protocol because of concerns over “hot air” – the idea that emissions caps might credit reductions that had already happened. (See this detailed history for more.)
Announcing the adoption of the EU ETS on 23 July 2003, the environment commissioner Margot Wallström said in a statement: “Today’s proposal and the emissions trading system just adopted by the Council and the European Parliament are evidence of our strong commitment to cutting greenhouse gas emissions and to the Kyoto Protocol.”
In the “recital” (introduction) to the latest reforms, the ETS is described as the “cornerstone of the Union’s climate policy”. The ETS cap is now set to shrink to 43% below 2005 levels in 2030, as part of the overall EU 2030 target to cut emissions “at least 40%” below 1990 levels.
What does the EU ETS cover?
The EU ETS is the world’s largest carbon market (see graphic, below), at least until China launches its national market, due for launch this year, but subject to delays and uncertainty.
Carbon pricing schemes around the world, including their nature (ETS or carbon tax), sectoral coverage and share of national or regional emissions. Source: State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2017, World Bank.
The EU ETS covers airlines and more than 11,000 industrial sites, responsible for around 45% of EU greenhouse gas emissions – currently around 2bn tonnes of CO2 equivalent. This includes CO2 from industry, the power sector and aviation, plus nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbons from industry. (This handy European Commission primer has more background.)
CO 2 equivalent: Greenhouse gases can be expressed in terms of carbon dioxide equivalent, or CO 2 eq. For a given amount, different greenhouse gases trap different amounts of heat in the atmosphere, a quantity known as the global warming potential. Carbon dioxide equivalent is a way of comparing emissions from all greenhouse gases, not just carbon dioxide.
Only flights between EU member states are covered, with flights outside the bloc still exempted, pending a review of the international aviation emissions trading scheme known as CORSIA.
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein also participate in the EU ETS. Meanwhile, the EU and Switzerland recently agreed to link their schemes – following seven years of talks – meaning emissions credits can be traded between the two.
Who pays for EU ETS allowances?
Also embedded in the initial 2003 ETS directive is the “polluter pays principle” and, as such, industry should pay for its carbon emissions. In the initial phases, however, most emissions credits were handed out for free, first to familiarise participants with the system and create a functioning market, then later to protect industry from overseas competition not facing a carbon price.
The recital (introduction) to the reform text explains:
“[The 2003 ETS directive] provides for a transition to full auctioning over time. Avoiding carbon leakage is a justification to temporarily postpone full auctioning, and targeted free allocation of allowances to industry is justified in order to address genuine risks of increases in greenhouse gas emissions in third countries where industry is not subject to comparable carbon constraints as long as comparable climate policy measures are not undertaken by other major economies.”
In the first phase, from 2005 to 2007, virtually 100% of carbon credits entering the market were given out for free, falling to an average of 96% during phase 2, from 2008 to 2018, according to an analysis of market data by carbon market NGO Sandbag, carried out for Carbon Brief, shown in the chart, below.
During phase 3, which runs until 2020, the free share fell dramatically because power stations stopped receiving allowances for free. Sandbag’s analysis suggests an average of 53% of the allowances entering the market during phase 3 will be free.
Share of emissions allowances entering the market each year that are allocated for free, under the first four phases of the EU ETS from 2005-2030 and excluding aviation. Source: Sandbag analysis for Carbon Brief, based on past market data and a model of the outcome of reforms. This assumes the market stability reserve (MSR) will prevent some allowances entering the market, shrinking the auction pot, while poorer member states will make full use of a derogation from auctioning, allowing them to give their power sectors free allowances. See below for more explanation of these details. Chart by Carbon Brief using Highcharts.
Phase 4 runs from 2021 to 2030 and was the subject of the latest reforms, which will have an uncertain impact on the share of carbon credits handed out for free. Sandbag’s analysis suggests that 60% of allowances entering the market could be given for free, an increase on phase 3.
This assumes three elements of the reforms kick in. First, if too many free allowances are claimed, then up to 3% of the cap can be shifted from the auction share to the free allocation share, see below. Second, poorer member states can hand their power sectors some free allowances.
Third, some allowances are likely to be removed from the market because of the market stability reserve (MSR, see below). These removals come out of the auction share, which effectively raises the share of allowances entering the market that are given out for free, even as it tightens the market overall.
Note that this analysis excludes aviation emissions. Some 15% of CO2 emissions from flights between EU nations are supposed to be subject to auction during phase 3. This share is to be maintained through phase 4.
What is the EU carbon price?
The EU ETS has also been plagued by persistently low carbon prices – for those that do have to pay for their pollution. Emissions allowances (EUAs) have cost less than €10 per tonne since late 2018, far below most estimates of the social cost of carbon and below the level thought to be necessary to drive deep decarbonisation.
Daily EU ETS carbon prices. Source: ICE EUA futures via Sandbag and Quandl. Chart by Sandbag using Highcharts.
Prices fell after the financial crisis because free allocation continued at levels based on pre-crisis economic activity, whereas industrial output contracted. Meanwhile, the spread of more efficient appliances and renewable sources of electricity cut demand for permits. This left a flooded market.
Opinion is divided on whether the latest reforms will resolve these problems and raise prices (see below).
How is the EU ETS being reformed?
The reforms agreed in November were meant to codify the rules of market operation during phase 4 of the ETS from 2021 to 2030. They ended up also aiming to correct persistently low prices, while continuing to shield industry from overseas competitors facing no carbon price and keeping eastern European states on board.
Specifically, the reforms bring the EU ETS into alignment with the EU’s overall 2030 climate target, of at least a 40% cut below 1990 levels. They update the rules on free allocation of allowances. They attempt to squeeze the market surplus, raising prices. And they extend and expand the support for energy system upgrades in eastern European countries, which has been the quid pro quo for their support of the ETS.
This uneasy balancing act saw a series of stand-offs – most prominently over support for coal power – inevitably settled by compromise. This, along with the uncertain effects of economic growth, technological change and other national and EU climate policy, means that carbon price increases – and the ETS’s role at the heart of EU climate policy – are far from assured. المزيد عن هذا لاحقا.
The EU’s topline 40%-by-2030 goal means the overall ETS cap must shrink more quickly, by 48MtCO2e each year, up from 38Mt/yr during phase 3. (This fixed annual reduction is confusingly described as a percentage “linear reduction factor” of 1.74% in phase 3 and 2.2% in phase 4. The percent refers to a proportion of the average annual cap during 2008-2018.)
What is the market stability reserve?
The other key element of the reforms is the market stability reserve (MSR), which will hold excess allowances outside the market starting from 2019. This is effectively a central bank for the carbon market, designed to stabilise supply and demand for credits, which will kick in from January 2019.
Hæge Fjellheim, head of carbon analysis for information providers Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, tells Carbon Brief:
“This reform has been going for two years. If you take it from that point in time, you would have been surprised that it was quite a strong outcome in terms of strengthening the EU ETS and the market balance, because the aim of the reform was not to tighten the balance…It’s tightening the screw on the oversupply issue, which has been the main problem of the ETS.”
The MSR was agreed in 2018, but has been strengthened in two ways. Lawmakers agreed to significantly tighten its parameters, so that it takes more credits out of circulation each year, while it will also now cancel credits if the surplus becomes large enough.
First, 24% of the market surplus will be removed each year between 2019 and 2023 and placed into the reserve, if the surplus exceeds 833m credits – enough to cover the annual emissions of the whole German economy. The reforms doubled this rate, compared to the 12% agreed in 2018, though the removal rate will revert to 12% from 2024. If the surplus falls below 400Mt, 100m credits will be released from the reserve into the market.
Second, if the number of credits in the reserve exceeds the volume auctioned in the previous year, then the excess will be automatically and permanently removed from the market. (Technically, they will be “invalidated” rather than “cancelled”; it is not clear what this distinction means, says Marcus Ferdinand, lead analyst for EU power and carbon markets at information provider ICIS Carbon Analytics.)
The automatic cancellation will remove an estimated 2.4GtCO2e of allowances from the market during phase 4, according to Thomson Reuters Point Carbon.
Can countries cancel carbon credits?
Another element of the reforms allows ETS member states to voluntarily cancel allowances from their auction share, in response to the closure of electricity generating capacity that will no longer bid into the market. Cancellations are limited to the emissions of the closing capacity.
Worker with steel forge. Credit: Cultura Creative (RF) / Alamy Stock Photo.
This could apply to UK coal-fired power stations, for example, which are closing as a result of the government’s phaseout pledge. (At the start of phase 3, the UK’s coal fleet was responsible for nearly 7% of EU ETS emissions, meaning their closure strongly affects the overall market.)
Countries could use voluntary cancellation to demonstrate greater climate ambition, says Rachel Solomon Williams, managing director of carbon market NGO Sandbag. Sweden is already voluntarily buying and cancelling ETS allowances, though only around 7MtCO2e per year.
If governments decide to voluntarily cancel carbon credits, however, they would have to forego the revenue from auctioning those allowances.
“I’m very sceptical this measure will be used on a largescale,” Ferdinand tells Carbon Brief. He adds: “I think there will always be a quarrel between the environment and finance ministries.”
Auction revenues amount to billions of euros each year across the EU, of which 80% is earmarked for climate and energy spending, research for the European Commission suggests. For example, the UK government earns around £0.5bn a year from ETS auctions – and the Office for Budget Responsibility assumes this will continue at least until the end of its forecast period in 2022/23.
(If the UK leaves the EU ETS on the March 2019 Brexit date, or after a transitional phase, then this revenue would cease. The UK’s future role in the ETS is undecided, see below.)
Nevertheless, combined with the strengthened MSR, this reform overturns the “waterbed effect”. This is the idea that climate action outside the ETS not only undermines the market, by weakening demand, but also achieves no extra emissions savings because the annual market cap is fixed. (Pushing down on one part of the “waterbed” of emissions only serves to raise them elsewhere.)
This charge has been levelled at the UK’s top-up carbon tax, the carbon price floor, for example.
Yet disagreement remains over the appropriate balance between relying on the ETS and implementing additional EU or national climate policies. (See below for more details.)
How are free allowances handed out?
During phase 4 of the EU ETS from 2021 to 2030, industries will continue to get “transitional” support in the form of free emissions permits, if they are deemed at risk of competition from overseas firms that do not pay an equivalent carbon price.
Carbon leakage: Carbon leakage is the idea that emissions-intensive industry could relocate production to another jurisdiction, to avoid paying (the same level of) carbon prices. Emissions would fall in the country where CO2 is priced but might not change on a global level, or might even increase, if overseas industry is less efficient, more coal-powered or further away, necessitating extra transport of goods. A 2018 study for the UK government says: “Empirical studies of carbon leakage in the EU ETS generally fail to find convincing evidence of substantial leakage,” even though theoretical studies suggest it should be problem.
Industry sectors at risk of this carbon leakage will – in principle – continue to get 100% of their allowances for free. Even sectors not at risk of carbon leakage will still get 30% free allowances until 2026, falling to 0% by 2030. Their free allocation had been due to stop in 2026.
A new consultation on revising the list of sectors deemed at risk runs until 2 February 2018. Phase 4 will continue using a binary at-risk/not-at-risk approach, with those at risk getting 100% free allowances, rather than a graduated approach advocated by NGO Sandbag.
In order to reduce windfall profits from excess free allowances when production falls – as happened in the wake of the financial crisis – free allocations will be adjusted up or down if an installation’s output over two years changes by more than a 10% threshold.
The power sector is not given free allowances, though phase 4 extends a partial exception to this for the 10 poorest EU member states in eastern Europe, including the likes of Poland, Romania and Hungary (see below). For the rest of industry, according to Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, the “lion’s share will continue to be considered at high risk of carbon leakage and receive 100% of their benchmark [emissions] as free allocation”.
During phase 4, the “benchmark” rate at which each industry can claim free allowances will shrink by between 0.2% and 1.6% per year, to reflect progress in improving efficiency. This benchmark rate is based on the most carbon-efficient 10% of sites within each sector.
Claims for benchmarked free allowances are added up across industries and countries, then checked against that year’s overall cap and the volume set aside for auctions, which is supposed to average 57% across phase 4. If too many free allowances are claimed, then allocations are reduced uniformly, across the board, using a “cross sectoral correction factor” (CSCF).
During phase 3, this has meant all industries, including those most at risk of carbon leakage, receiving less than 100% of their allowances for free, undermining efforts to shield them from the impact of climate policy.
Under the phase 4 reforms, up to 3 percentage points of the auction volume can be transferred into extra free allowances, in order to avoid triggering the CSCF.
This would raise the share of free allowances handed out from 43% to 46%, meaning around half a billion fewer credits available for auction, according to NGO Sandbag. This would translate into more than €3.5bn in lost auction revenues for member states, even at current low ETS prices.
How does the EU ETS support eastern Europe and innovation?
Several EU ETS support schemes will continue through phase 4. These schemes, designed to support innovation across Europe and energy sector modernisation in poorer states, come with rules attached – though the strictness of the rules is unclear. These funds were also used to leverage political support, both for ETS reforms and the wider EU 2030 climate and energy targets.
Fiat Panda and Fiat 500 production line in factory, Tychy, Poland. Credit: Bart Pro/Alamy Stock Photo.
The innovation fund, managed at EU level and funded via 400m allowances, will continue to be used to finance research and development of: “CCS or CCU [carbon capture and storage or usage] facilities, new renewable energy technologies and industrial innovation”.
For eastern Europe, two ETS schemes are supposed to assist energy system upgrades, under articles 10c and 10d of the directive.
When the power sector stopped receiving free allowances in 2018, poorer EU countries were allowed to continue handing out credits, covering up to 70% of emissions in 2018, declining to zero in 2020. This “article 10c” derogation was conditional on the 10 countries – Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Romania – investing the equivalent amount in “the modernisation of electricity generation”.
These countries must submit national plans explaining what the money was going towards. Specifically, the plans should address: “Investments in retrofitting and upgrading of the infrastructure and clean technologies. The national plan shall also provide for the diversification of their energy mix and sources of supply.”
The European Commission approved allocation of up to 680m free allowances under 10c by 2019, with a market value estimated at €12bn, according to NGO Carbon Market Watch. It says that in practice, 90% of the money was invested in existing fossil fuel infrastructure, mostly coal.
Can EU ETS funds still be used to support coal?
The article 10c derogation was extended and expanded under the phase 4 reforms, allowing those 10 eastern European countries to allocate up to 60% of power sector emissions allowances for free, with their value matched by investment as before.
This 60% figure is an increase from the 40% agreed by member state governments in 2018. While the revised legal text includes a series of new conditions, these leave considerable wiggle room. (The European Parliament had called for a 450gCO2 per kilowatt hour threshold for support, effectively an outright ban on support for coal power.)
The text says: “The investments supported shall be consistent with the transition to a safe and sustainable low-carbon economy, the objectives of the Union’s 2030 climate and energy policy framework, and reaching the long term objectives as expressed in the Paris Agreement. This derogation shall end on 31 December 2030.”
Investments financed through article 10c – and worth more than €12.5m – must be subject to competitive bidding. Additionally, they must: “contribute to the diversification of their energy mix and sources of supply, the necessary restructuring, environmental upgrading and retrofitting of the infrastructure, or modernisation of the energy production.”
Further loosely worded conditions say projects must “not contribute to or improve the financial viability of highly emission-intensive electricity generation nor increase dependency on emission-intensive fossil fuels”.
Funding must also “realise a predetermined significant level of CO2 reductions”. Where new power capacity is added, this must be matched by the closure of “a corresponding amount of more emission-intensive…capacity”.
The second EU ETS scheme for eastern Europe is the article 10d “modernisation fund”, offered in 2018 in return for Polish support of the EU 2030 climate goals. This is administered at EU level and financed with 2% of total allowances for the period 2021-2030 (310Mt), with an optional extra 0.5%.
The revised text says: “No support from this fund shall be provided to energy generation facilities using solid fossil fuels,” ruling out EU money for coal. The text adds that 70% shall go towards renewables, energy efficiency, grid infrastructure or support for “just transition” in mining regions.
The net impact of the reforms to these two support schemes for eastern Europe is uncertain. This will be a balance between the raising of the 10c derogation to 60% free allocation, its new but loosely-worded funding criteria and the ban on support for coal under the 10d modernisation fund.
Fjellheim tells Carbon Brief:
“We want to look into this a bit more, because what does it really mean? It looks like a big win for those that didn’t want to fund coal, but with the raised ceiling to 60%, it is not really clear…It looks strict but it might not be that strict in the end.”
Will the latest reforms raise carbon prices?
Most analysts expect the reforms to tighten the market surplus and raise carbon prices in the short term, from today’s roughly €7/tCO2e to around €10 through 2018, reports newswire Carbon Pulse.
In terms of future carbon prices, the strengthened MSR is the most important aspect of the reforms, says Ferdinand. He tells Carbon Brief: “Honestly, I’m quite bullish. The main driver is the MSR doubling [of the annual intake rate, from 12 to 24% of the market surplus].”
Ferdinand thinks the MSR will cut the volume of allowances available for auction roughly in half from 2019, a cut of around 400MtCO2e. He also expects rising prices to change participants’ strategic approach to hedging, encouraging them to hold on to unused credits and squeezing the surplus available to the market.
He says: “If you are an industrial sitting on surplus allowances when the price is rising, we don’t believe all of those will come to market.”
All this means prices could rise to €9-10/tCO2e in 2018 and €36 in 2024, Ferdinand says, before easing off towards €23 in 2030, as the MSR intake rate drops back to 12% per year and after higher prices have driven faster-than-expected cuts in emissions.
At the lower end of the forecast spectrum is Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, which sees prices rising to €10 in 2020 and €23 in 2023. Fjellheim explains: “We think the MSR will tighten the market considerably, but we assume market participants to be forward looking…so that means they price in future shortages already today.” This means prices will only rise gradually.
Fjellheim tells Carbon Brief:
“We have lower prices than many other analysts…There is more risk to the down side than the upside, if you look at related policies like coal phaseout.”
This highlights a central problem for the EU ETS. The phase 4 reforms tackle only one side of the supply-demand balance, by attempting to reduce the number of surplus allowances on the market. Yet the other half of this equation – demand for emissions credits – is also affected by related climate policy, as well as unrelated market forces.
Reflecting this uncertainty, analysts set out a wide range of ETS price predictions at a September 2017 conference organised by specialist newswire Carbon Pulse. It reported that analysts MKonline forecast a €14 peak, due to weak demand as emissions cuts are made for other reasons.
Meanwhile, consultancy Energy Aspects sees a gradual rise to €38 by 2030, interrupted in the mid-2020s by tighter air pollution limits under the EU Industrial Emissions Directive, which force the closure of coal plants burning dirtier lignite fuel.
Emissions – and, therefore, market demand under the EU ETS – have been falling rapidly, according to analysis from Sandbag. It says emissions fell by 2.9% on average between 2005 and 2018, then by 2.6% on average through 2018.
If emissions reductions continue at a similar rate through the 2020s, Sandbag analysis suggests, then the size of the ETS market surplus – currently around 1.7bn allowances – would remain the same until 2030, despite the impact of the phase 4 reforms and the tightened MSR.
Sandbag’s Soloman Williams tells Carbon Brief:
“We can’t see [the reforms] having a massive impact on the carbon price. We still think there will be a relatively low price by 2030, simply because there will be no scarcity [of allowances]. Scarcity drives prices.”
It’s worth adding that analysts’ forecasts have tended to overestimate prices on carbon markets.
What is the best way to strengthen carbon markets?
Views diverge on the appropriate response to the interaction between the EU ETS and other climate policies, sometimes referred to as “overlapping” action.
One solution is simply to avoid raising the ambition of other policies, such as national coal phaseouts or moves to raise the EU’s 2030 targets for renewables and energy efficiency. Yet these other actions are, by their very nature, decided by a wide range of actors and so hard to control.
Fjellheim tells Carbon Brief:
“Countries that want higher carbon prices are also more eager to put in place national policies that would work in the other way, going above and beyond their EU targets. I definitely see a risk that countries will continue to move forward on overlapping policies – at least a risk to the carbon price and the ETS as the main instrument of climate policy…There will always be national aims, policies and electorates so it’s naive to think of the ETS as the only instrument of climate policy.”
Does the EU ETS need a floor price?
Another solution is to underpin the ETS with a minimum “floor price” for carbon emissions, a move pushed by French president Emmanuel Macron in September.
French presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron visits a Deutsche Bahn training programme for young refugees in Berlin, Germany, 10/01/2017. Photo: Soeren Stache/dpa/Alamy Stock Photo.
The Netherlands has pledged to join the UK in setting its own carbon price floor from next year. It will also join Sweden in buying and cancelling allowances. Meanwhile Belgium is also looking at setting a minimum carbon price.
Support for the idea comes in a November 2017 paper published by the Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC), which says: “The EU ETS is in crisis.” Its authors include prominent climate economist Prof Ottmar Edenhofer.
The paper argues:
“Introducing a carbon price floor can re-affirm the role of the EU ETS as the central pillar in the European effort towards decarbonisation. Such a price floor should start at an economically significant level and rise over time…Many observers argue that it is misguided to focus on the EU ETS allowance (EUA) price, since the emissions cap determines environmental effectiveness and the allowance market works well in technical terms.”
The paper lists a range of arguments against this view, including that the market operates inefficiently due to “private sector short-sightedness and regulatory uncertainty” and that national climate measures dampen the EU carbon price.
“The recent EU ETS reform effort offers an entry point to tackle these concerns, but does not sufficiently address the underlying problems. The magnitude and direction of its impact on the EUA price is highly uncertain. More fundamental change will be required to reaffirm the role of the EU ETS as the central pillar of European decarbonisation efforts.”
[Consultancy Futureproof has an incredibly detailed discussion of the technical and interpretational issues that create ambiguity around the EU ETS and the EU’s overall climate goals.]
Can the EU ETS be changed again?
Arguments over the strength of the EU ETS will continue to play out over the years ahead, with the phase 4 reforms making explicit provision for the rules to be regularly reviewed.
The text says: “The provisions of this directive should be kept under review in the light of international developments and efforts undertaken to achieve the long-term objectives of the Paris Agreement.”
“If there’s political will, [politicians] could still tighten the screw,” says Fjellheim.
The reviews are aligned to the five-yearly timetable of global stocktakes under the Paris deal. This will include an early review of the ETS reforms in the context of the 2018 “Talanoa Dialogue”, which will take stock of progress via three questions (“Where are we? Where do we want to go? How do we get there?”), in order to inform the next round of international Paris climate pledges.
This 2018 review is probably too early to make changes to the ETS, says ICIS’s Ferdinand, given reforms have only just been agreed. Further changes are more likely around the 2023 Paris Agreement stocktake, he suggests.
These regular reviews “may consider whether it is appropriate to complement [the ETS]…with carbon border adjustments”, the introductory reform text says. The parameters of the MSR will also be subject to review, in 2021.
Separately, a 2020 review of the planned international aviation emissions trading scheme, known as CORSIA, will inform a decision on continued exemption of extra-EU flights from the ETS.
The ETS reform text also says: “Action from the International Maritime Organization or the EU should start from 2023.” It requests annual reports from the commission to track progress.
ماذا عن خروج بريطانيا من الاتحاد الأوروبي؟
One final complication for the EU ETS is the UK’s planned EU exit on 29 March 2019, which falls before the April 2019 ETS compliance deadline for emissions in 2018. In response to this looming deadline, the European Commission proposed a “safeguarding” rule to invalidate UK carbon allowances issued from 1 January 2018, worth around €1bn to government and industry.
The thinking was that if the UK left the ETS in 2019, without a transitional or final deal on the future relationship, then holders of UK industry would no longer need its allowances and could flood the market, sending carbon prices plunging.
After several rounds of furious diplomacy, EU nations recently agreed to a revised safeguarding rule that aims to avoid the writing off of those €1bn in allowances while shielding the EU ETS from market disruption. This agreement is contingent on a rule-change that will bring forward the compliance deadline for UK firms. In a consultation on making this change, the UK government says:
“To ensure a smooth transition and avoid a cliff edge on withdrawal, the UK has proposed to the EU an implementation period of about two years where we would continue to have access to each other’s markets on current terms. We are calling for this to be agreed as early as possible to provide clarity.”
Ferdinand tells Carbon Brief: “A transition period would postpone the cliff edge, but the difficulty would still be there. But you could be much better prepared.”
As to what happens to the UK’s participation in the EU ETS after Brexit and any transition period, the UK government has been making holding statements that keep all options open. On 20 November, for example, climate minister Claire Perry told parliament:
“The government is considering all options for the UK’s future participation, or otherwise, in the EU Emissions Trading System after our exit from the EU. The effect on the cost of EU allowances will depend on the nature of the UK’s future relationship with the system and will be taken into account as part of this consideration.”
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